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I.  Introduction 
September 11, 2001 changed America forever.  Although no one can value 
the lives lost, the 9/11 attacks cost the American economy an estimated $1 
trillion.1  Such an economic loss sent shock waves through the global economy.2 
For the insurance industry, the 9/11 attacks were a "clash event."3  A clash 
event is characterized by catastrophic industry loss across multiple lines of 
insurance coverage.4  As a result of 9/11, approximately 150 insurers and 
reinsurers5 suffered an estimated $32.5 billion in losses.6  Insured property losses 
totaled over $11 billion.7 
                                                                                                                 
 1. DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21937, 9/11 TERRORISM:  GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC COSTS 1 (2004). 
 2. See id. at 3 ("[M]ost of the world dropped into a synchronous recession—from 
4.1% world economic growth in 2000 to 1.4% in 2001 (a growth rate of less than 2% for the 
world is considered to be recessionary).").  "By late 2002, aggressive reflationary fiscal and 
monetary policy in the United States and a booming Chinese economy led the recovery."  Id.  
Interestingly, these same "aggressive reflationary fiscal and monetary policies" (i.e., the 
slashing of interest rates by the Federal Reserve in 2001 and 2002) helped create a "perfect 
storm" that brought the global economy to its knees in 2008.  See Manav Tanneeru, How a 
"Perfect Storm" Led to the Economic Crisis, CNN (Jan. 29, 2009), http://articles. 
cnn.com/2009-01-29/us/economic.crisis.explainer_1_housing-bubble-housing-market-wall-
street?_s=PM:US (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) (noting how dominoes that began to fall on 
9/11 helped precipitate the meltdown of 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  Thus, at least from a macroeconomic perspective, the global economy continues to 
feel the economic consequences of the 9/11 attacks. 
 3. Michelle Boardman, Known Illusions: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 
GEO L.J. 783, 784 (2005). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Looking Beyond TRIA: A Clinical 
Examination of Potential Terrorism Loss Sharing  4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12069, 2006), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
risk/downloads/06-07-HK.pdf. 
 6. Andrea Wells, 9/11 and Terrorism Risk Ten Years Later, INS. J., Sept. 9, 2011. 
 7. Robert P. Hartwig, 9/11 and Insurance:  The Five Year Anniversary, INSURANCE 
TERROR CATs 1827 
Prior to 9/11, insurers did not view terrorism as a risk.8  Accordingly, 
insurers failed to account for terrorism in their premiums or underwriting 
calculations.9  This oversight was due to the fact that historically, terrorism 
losses were small and uncorrelated.10  Large-scale terrorist attacks, such as 
the 9/11 attacks, however, are correlated risks.11  Unlike uncorrelated risks,12 
correlated risks make it difficult for insurers to spread or "pool" those risks.13  
Without the ability to pool risks, insurance companies cannot hedge many 
uncorrelated risks of loss against many other uncorrelated risks of loss.14  
This prevents insurance companies from offsetting earned premiums against 
coverage payments.15  Following 9/11, the risk of terrorism losses became 
real and difficult to manage.16 
                                                                                                                 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE (2006), http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?a=top_pc& 
id=109762. 
 8. See RICHARD J. HILLMAN, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-472T, 
TERRORISM INSURANCE:  RISING UNINSURED EXPOSURE TO ATTACKS HEIGHTENS POTENTIAL 
ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES 3 (2002) (explaining that prior to 9/11, the insurance industry 
"considered the risk [of terrorism in America] . . . low"). 
 9. See id. (noting that prior to 9/11, insurers did not identify or price potential losses 
from terrorism).  
 10. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 3 ("[E]ven after the terrorist 
attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, 
insurers . . . did not view . . . terrorism as a risk that should be [priced] . . . because losses 
from terrorism had been historically small, and . . . uncorrelated."). 
 11. See Alexia Brunet, Searle Ctr. Research Symp. On Ins. Mkts. & Regulation, 
Regulating the Market for Terrorism Insurance 12 (2008) ("Correlated risk refers to the 
simultaneous occurrence of many losses from a single event.  Natural disasters, for instance, 
produce highly correlated losses due to the nature of the event."); Boardman, supra note 3, at 
820 ("[T]he terrorism risk is a correlated risk.").  Although this is true, not all risks of 
terrorism are correlated.  Indeed, "smaller isolated terrorist attacks would not be correlated 
because too few people and buildings would be affected."  Id. at 821.  However, "[a]ny large 
or coordinated series of attacks . . . would be highly correlated."  Id.  Because terrorists have 
demonstrated an ability and willingness to carry out large-scale, coordinated attacks, the risk 
of such attacks is the terrorism risk currently facing America.  Id. 
 12. See Boardman, supra note 3, at 820 (stating that "[a]n independent or uncorrelated 
risk is not allied with the other risks with which it would be pooled," which allows an 
insurer "to successfully spread the risk across the pool and across time"). 
 13. See HERBERT B. MAYO, INVESTMENTS:  AN INTRODUCTION 163 (9th ed. 2008) 
("Diversification and the reduction in unsymptomatic risk require that [risks] not be . . . 
positively correlated. When there is a high positive correlation, there is no risk reduction."). 
 14. See id. ("The lower the positive correlation or the greater the negative correlation 
among the [risks], the greater will be the risk reduction achieved by combining the various 
[risks] in the portfolio."). 
 15. See id. (noting that without risk pooling, insurance companies cannot offset losses 
with revenues). 
 16. See Boardman, supra note 3, at 786–87 ("After 9/11, the risk was considered too 
high, too volatile, and too uncertain to be priced."). 
1828 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1825 (2011) 
In the face of this new and uncertain risk, insurers left the market to 
reduce their risk exposure.17  Reinsurers, who absorbed two-thirds of 9/11’s 
insured losses,18 left first.19  That reinsurers are mostly unregulated 
facilitated the reinsurers’ withdrawal.20  Primary insurers, closely regulated 
by state law, responded by leaving problematic markets21 and adding 
terrorism coverage exclusions where possible.22  If state law did not allow 
for a hasty withdrawal or prohibited terrorism exclusions, then primary 
insurers drastically raised premiums and deductibles while reducing 
coverage limits.23  This priced terrorism insurance out of most 
policyholders’ reach.24 
Following 9/11, as the commercial property and casualty insurance 
markets hardened, lenders began requiring property owners and developers 
to obtain terrorism insurance.25  This hardening of the insurance market, 
coupled with new demands that mortgagees obtain terrorism insurance to 
secure their encumbered assets, halted large capital projects.26 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See id. at 787 (noting insurers’ withdraw from the terrorism insurance market). 
 18. See HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 8 (noting that "reinsurers are expected to ultimately 
pay about two-thirds" of 9/11’s insured losses). 
 19. See Boardman, supra note 3, at 787 ("Reinsurers pulled out of the terrorism risk 
market first."). 
 20. See Anne Gron & Allen O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for 
the Government as an Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447, 452 (2003) ("Reinsurance markets are 
largely unregulated . . . ."). 
 21. See HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 6–7 ("Early indications suggest that many 
businesses, particularly those in large metropolitan areas, are already beginning to 
experience difficulty obtaining terrorism coverage as their policies come to renewal."). 
 22. See id. at 5 ("[Insurance Services Organization], acting on behalf of [property and 
casualty] insurers, . . . file[d] a request in every state for permission to exclude terrorism 
from all commercial insurance coverage.  As of February 22, 2002, 45 states and the District 
of Columbia and Puerto Rico had approved the ISO exclusion . . . ."). 
 23. See The Council of Insurance Agents & Brokers, CIAB Shows Businesses 
Rejecting Terrorism Coverage, IRMI.COM (Mar. 2003), http://www.irmi.com/expert/ 
articles/2003/ciab03.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) ("‘When a carrier does not want the 
exposure, they are pricing coverage at 100 percent of the property rate so that no clients elect 
the coverage’, said the broker from the Southeast who handles large accounts.") (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 24. See id. (noting that when insurers could not leave the market, they made insurance 
prohibitively expensive for insureds).  
 25. See Laura M. Reiter, The Need for a Long-Term Federal Backstop in the 
Terrorism Insurance Market, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 243, 258 (2007) ("[B]ecause 
of th[e] ongoing [terrorism] threat, real estate and construction businesses are often required 
to obtain terrorism insurance in order to receive loans from banks and other lenders."). 
 26. See Terrorism Threats and the Insurance Market:  Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv. and the Subcomm. 
TERROR CATs 1829 
The federal government reacted to the hardening of the insurance 
market and the economic downturn with the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
of 2002 (TRIA).27  Congress intended TRIA to be a temporary solution to 
the hardening of the insurance market so that the private insurance market 
could respond to the new terrorism risk.28 
Although TRIA stabilized the terrorism insurance market,29 it failed to 
encourage the long-term private market response that Congress desired.30  
Thus, TRIA only achieved half of its original mission:  It has reduced 
volatility in the commercial property and casualty insurance market post-
9/11.31  On the other hand, TRIA has failed to produce the private market 
response it hoped to encourage.32  Congress intended TRIA to last until 
                                                                                                                 
on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec., 109th Cong. 34 (2006) (statement of Jeffrey DeBoer, President and CEO, 
The Real Estate Roundtable) ("[I]n the post-9/11, pre-TRIA days . . . about $15 billion worth 
of real estate transactions had been stalled or completely canceled nationwide."). 
 27. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 note (2002)) [hereinafter TRIA]. 
 28. See TRIA, § 301(a)(6) ("[T]he United States Government should provide 
temporary financial compensation to insured parties, contributing to the stabilization of the 
United States economy in a time of national crisis, while the financial services 
industry . . . create[s] a viable financial services market for private terrorism risk insurance." 
(emphasis added)); see also id. § 301(b) ("The purpose of [TRIA] is to establish a temporary 
Federal program that provides . . . compensation for insured losses resulting from acts of 
terrorism, in order to . . . allow for a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, 
resume pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future losses . . . ." 
(emphasis added)). 
 29. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1057, TERRORISM INSURANCE:  
STATUS OF EFFORTS BY POLICYHOLDERS TO OBTAIN COVERAGE 13 (2008) [hereinafter 
TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS] (noting the current stability in the commercial 
property and casualty terrorism insurance market). 
 30. See Reiter, supra note 25, at 253 (noting that should TRIA expire, there would be 
no private market for terrorism insurance). 
 31. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 13 
("[C]ommercial property insurance currently appears to be widely available on a nationwide 
basis at rates viewed as reasonable, largely due to the TRIA program . . . .").  
 32. See Anthony L. Marré, Risky Business:  Why Current Developing Characteristics 
of the Commercial Real Estate Market Will Not Tolerate the Expiration of Federal 
Participation in Terrorism Insurance, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 144, 153 (2005) ("Insurers 
have yet to develop the mechanisms necessary to allow the market to continue to provide 
terrorism coverage in the absence of TRIA."); see also TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE 
STATUS, supra note 29, at 15 ("Without the federal backstop for potential insurance losses 
related to terrorism, industry participants said that coverage availability could decline 
substantially."); Reiter, supra note 25, at 253 ("[W]ith . . . 2007 . . . approaching, 
insurers . . . [wrote] springing exclusions’ into their new policies, automatically voiding 
terrorism coverage should Congress allow TRIA to sunset.").  "The largest risk . . . in the 
private market solution is that insurers will decide to abandon terrorism insurance altogether, 
1830 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1825 (2011) 
December 31, 2005.33  Congress has renewed TRIA twice, and it will now 
continue until at least 2014.34  Given the private market’s failure to 
respond,35 and the current state of the private commercial property and 
casualty insurance market following the 2008 global economic meltdown,36 
it is unlikely that the private market will be able to respond with a long-
term solution to terrorism risk. 
This Note argues that TRIA was never going to encourage a private 
market for terrorism insurance that could support itself without TRIA’s 
reinsurance backstop.  TRIA actively discouraged a private market 
response.37  This Note argues that continually renewing TRIA is 
unappealing, and that a long-term government response is needed.38  This 
Note will argue further that federal risk securitization may be a viable 
alternative to TRIA.39 
First, this Note details TRIA’s basic structure.40  In Part III, this Note 
details reasons why TRIA failed to produce the private market for terrorism 
insurance intended by Congress.41  These reasons include:  (A) TRIA’s 
mandatory/discretionary recovery provisions,42 (B) the fact that large 
insurers can game TRIA,43 (C) TRIA’s lack of an information-sharing 
                                                                                                                 
and as shown by the springing exclusions . . . this is almost a certainty."  Id. 
 33. See TRIA § 108(a) ("The Program shall terminate on December 31, 2005."). 
 34. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 § 108(a), Pub. L. No. 109-
144, 119 Stat. 2660 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 note (2005)) [hereinafter TRIEA] 
(extending TRIA through December 31, 2007); Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 108(a), Pub. L. No. 110-160, 121 Stat. 1839 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 6701 note (2007)) [hereinafter TRIPRA] (extending TRIA through December 31, 
2014). 
 35. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting the private market’s failure to 
respond to the terrorism risk under TRIA). 
 36. See Ernst & Young, 2011 Outlook:  US Property/Casualty Insurance Industry, 
GLOBAL INS. CTR., 1 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ 
2011_US_property_casualty_outlook/$FILE/US_property_casualty_outlook.pdf (noting the 
challenges the property/casualty insurance industry faces following 2008’s financial crisis).  
 37. See infra Part III (noting how TRIA discouraged a private market response to 
terrorism risk). 
 38. See infra Part IV (noting that an alternative to TRIA is needed). 
 39. See infra Part VI (proposing Terror CATs as an alternative to TRIA). 
 40. See infra Part II (outlining TRIA’s structure). 
 41. See infra Part III (noting TRIA’s failure to encourage a private terrorism insurance 
market). 
 42. See infra Part III.A (arguing that TRIA’s mandatory/discretionary recoupment 
provisions impeded development of a private market response). 
 43. See infra Part III.B (arguing that large insurers’ ability to game TRIA provides 
little incentive for large insurers to develop a private terrorism insurance market). 
TERROR CATs 1831 
provision and the resulting information asymmetry for terrorism risk,44 
(D) regulatory certainty,45 (E) the fact that insurers believe they may 
continue to rely on traditional coverage exclusions to limit terrorism 
losses,46 and (F) TRIA’s displacement of private reinsurance.47  This Note 
argues in Part IV that continually renewing TRIA is not attractive.48  Part V 
explores a number of proposed alternatives to TRIA and explains why these 
are not practical long-term solutions.49  Finally, after exploring the benefits 
of risk-linked securitization, Part VI proposes a long-term solution that 
would allow the federal government to securitize terrorism.50 
II.  The Structure of TRIA 
TRIA puts the federal government into the position of a reinsurer that 
covers insured terrorism losses.51  TRIA requires primary insurers offering 
commercial property and casualty insurance to offer terrorism coverage as 
well.52  Subject to state regulations, insurers determine the terms and 
conditions of terrorism coverage, but terrorism insurance must be offered 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See infra Part III.C (arguing that without more information on terrorism risk, 
private insurers cannot develop a market for terrorism insurance without federal 
reinsurance). 
 45. See infra Part III.D (noting that the regulatory certainty TRIA creates is attractive 
to both insurers and insureds). 
 46. See infra Part III.E (arguing that insurers’ limited loss exposure under TRIA 
makes litigating coverage exclusions cost-effective). 
 47. See infra Part III.F (arguing that TRIA leaves little room for private reinsurance to 
respond to terrorism risk and prevents private reinsurers from gaining experience dealing 
with terrorism). 
 48. See infra Part IV (noting that an alternative to TRIA is needed). 
 49. See infra Part V (detailing a number of proposed alternatives to TRIA and 
explaining why they are not favorable). 
 50. See infra Part VI (proposing an alternative to TRIA). 
 51. See Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Program:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Snow] (testimony of John W. Snow, Treasury 
Secretary), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js 
2630.aspx ("TRIA represents a form of publicly-provided and subsidized terrorism risk 
reinsurance, which essentially transfers risks associated with terrorism losses from the 
private to the public sector (taxpayers)."). 
 52. See TRIPRA § 103(5)(c) ("[E]ach entity that meets the definition of an insurer 
under section 102 . . . shall make available, in all of its property and casualty insurance 
policies, [terrorism] coverage for insured losses"); id. § 102(12) ("The term ‘property and 
casualty insurance’ . . . means commercial lines of property and casualty insurance, 
including . . . workers’ compensation insurance and directors and officers liability 
insurance."). 
1832 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1825 (2011) 
"under the same terms and conditions as other, non-terrorism coverage."53  
Unless mandated by state law, insureds are not required to purchase the 
offered terrorism insurance.54  Additionally, TRIA preempted all terrorism 
exclusions in commercial property and casualty insurance policies, 
invalidating the exclusions to the extent that they prevented recovery of an 
otherwise recoverable loss.55 
Following an aggregate industry loss of $100 million56 caused by a 
certified terrorist attack,57 the federal government will provide primary 
insurers 85% reinsurance coverage for insured losses.58  To receive 
reinsurance coverage, each primary insurer must pay a deductible equal to 
20% of each insurer’s prior year’s direct earned premiums.59  These direct 
earned premiums include only the premiums earned on lines of insurance 
                                                                                                                 
 53. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-39, TERRORISM INSURANCE:  
STATUS OF COVERAGE AVAILABILITY FOR ATTACKS INVOLVING NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, 
CHEMICAL, OR RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 9 (2008) [hereinafter TERRORISM INSURANCE:  
NBCR COVERAGE]; see also TRIPRA § 103(c)(1)(B) (noting that terrorism insurance must 
be offered on terms similar to general commercial and property insurance). 
 54. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 6 ("Firms are not required to 
purchase [terrorism] insurance unless mandated by state law . . . ."). 
 55. See TRIPRA § 105(a)–(b) ("Any terrorism exclusion in a contract for property and 
casualty insurance . . . shall be void to the extent that it excludes losses that would otherwise 
be insured losses. . . .  Any state approval of any terrorism exclusion from a contract for 
property and casualty insurance . . . shall be void . . . ."). 
 56. See id. § 103(e)(1)(B)(ii) ("In the case of a certified act of terrorism . . . no 
compensation shall be paid . . . unless the aggregate industry insured losses resulting from 
such certified act of terrorism exceed . . . $100,000,000 . . . ."). 
 57. See id. § 102(1)(A) (defining "act of terrorism" and establishing the certification 
process). 
 58. See id. § 103(e)(1)(A) ("Federal . . . compensation . . . to be paid . . . for insured 
losses of an insurer . . . shall be equal to 85 percent, of that portion of the amount of such 
insured losses that exceeds the applicable insurer deductible . . . paid during . . . such 
Program Year."). 
 59. See id. § 103(e)(1)(a) (requiring each insurer to pay an "insurer deductible" before 
receiving federal compensation); id. § 102(7)(F) (establishing the "insurer deductible" for 
each insurer as 20% of each insurer’s prior year’s "direct earned premiums"); see also id. 
§ 102(4) (defining "direct earned premium" as "direct earned premium for property and 
casualty insurance issued by any insurer for insurance against losses occurring at the 
locations described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (5)"); id. § 102(5) 
("‘[I]nsured loss’ means any loss resulting from an act of terrorism . . . that is covered 
by . . . property and casualty insurance . . . if such loss (A) occurs within the United States; 
or (B) occurs to an air carrier . . . , to a United States flag vessel . . . , or at the premises of 
any United States mission.").  Thus, direct earned premiums would not include property and 
casualty premiums earned outside of the United States, or non-property and casualty 
premiums. 
TERROR CATs 1833 
that fall within TRIA’s coverage.60  Thus, premiums collected by insurers 
from insureds on life or automobile insurance policies would not be 
included in the calculation of what deductible insurers would pay under 
TRIA.61 
III.  Private Market’s Failure to Create a Long-Term Solution to 
Terrorism Risk 
A.  Mandatory/Discretionary Recovery 
One of TRIA’s largest shortcomings is its provision for recovering 
money paid to insurers following an insured terrorism loss.62  TRIA 
provides that the Secretary of the Treasury must recover government funds 
paid to insurers up to 133% of the difference between the $27.5 billion 
aggregate industry retention rate and deductibles collected from insurers 
following an attack.63  If insurers’ deductible payments exceed the 
aggregate industry retention rate, there is no mandatory recovery.64  Thus, 
the federal government recovers the $27.5 billion aggregate industry 
retention rate, plus an additional 33% surcharge for any amount the federal 
government paid out between insurers’ deductible payments and the $27.5 
billion aggregate industry retention rate.65  Any recovery of funds paid out 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 7 ("The insurer’s deductible is 
determined as a percentage of its total direct commercial property and casualty earned 
premiums of the preceding year for TRIA . . . lines (that is, lines covered by the act), and not 
just the premiums of clients that purchase terrorism coverage."). 
 61. See id. (noting that only insurer premiums from TRIA lines are included when 
calculating the insurer’s deductible under TRIA). 
 62. See infra notes 63–112 and accompanying text (noting the shortcomings of 
TRIA’s provisions for recovery of federal assistance paid above insurers’ deductibles 
following a terrorist attack). 
 63. See TRIPRA § 103(e)(7)(A)–(C) (providing for mandatory recovery up to and 
exceeding the aggregate industry retention rate); see also id. § 103(e)(6)(E) (setting the 
aggregate industry retention rate at $27,500,000,000).  
 64. See id. § 103(e)(7)(B) (providing for no mandatory recovery if insurers’ 
deductibles paid exceed the aggregate industry retention rate). 
 65. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (highlighting the provisions for 
mandatory recovery up to and exceeding the aggregate industry retention rate).  To illustrate 
this point, assume that terrorism insurers pay deductibles totaling $17,500,000,000 
immediately following a terrorist attack so they can receive TRIA reinsurance.  The 
difference between the aggregate industry retention rate and the amount collected from 
insurers would be $10,000,000,000. TRIPRA § 103(e)(6)(E).  Thus, the mandatory recovery 
amount would be $13,300,000,000 (10,000,000,000 * 1.33 = 13,300,000,000).  Id. 
§ 103(e)(7)(A)–(C). 
1834 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1825 (2011) 
above this amount depends on the Secretary of the Treasury’s discretion.66  
TRIA prescribes what the Secretary of the Treasury may consider when 
determining whether to require recovery above the mandatory recoupment 
amount: 
To the extent that the amount of Federal financial assistance . . . exceeds 
any mandatory recoupment amount, the Secretary may recoup, through 
terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums, such additional amounts that the 
Secretary believes can be recouped, based on—(i) the ultimate costs to 
taxpayers of no additional recoupment; (ii) the economic conditions in 
the commercial marketplace, including the capitalization, profitability, 
and investment returns of the insurance industry and the current cycle of 
the insurance markets; (iii) the affordability of commercial insurance for 
small- and medium-sized businesses; and (iv) such other factors as the 
Secretary considers appropriate.67 
Thus, discretionary recovery depends on the cost to taxpayers, insurance 
industry market conditions, and "other factors . . . the Secretary considers 
appropriate."68  Both mandatory and discretionary recovery amounts are 
collected as terrorism risk-loss spreading premiums.69 
The mandatory and discretionary recovery provisions set a soft cap on 
losses for both insureds and insurers.  Although it is possible that the 
Secretary of the Treasury could require recovery above the mandatory 
recoupment amount, such action is unlikely.70  There are a number of 
reasons for this conclusion.  First, giving plain meaning to the statute, the 
Secretary of the Treasury’s determination rests in large part on whether the 
Secretary of the Treasury believes federal assistance in excess of the 
mandatory recoupment amount "can" be recouped based on the health of 
the insurance industry and the affordability of such insurance for small- and 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See TRIPRA § 103(e)(7)(D) (providing for discretionary recoupment of federal 
funds paid in excess of the mandatory recovery point). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. § 103(e)(7)(C) ("The Secretary shall collect, for repayment of [the 
mandatory recoupment amount] . . . terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums . . . ."); id. 
§ 103(e)(7)(D) ("To the extent that the amount of Federal Financial assistance provided 
exceeds any mandatory recoupment amount, the Secretary may recoup, through terrorism 
loss risk-spreading premiums, such additional amounts that the Secretary believes can be 
recouped . . . ."). 
 70. See Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509, 2535 (2003) 
("[TRIA] vests the Treasury Secretary with the discretion to order the recoupment of all 
government compensation above the mandatory recoupment amount.  Exercise of this 
theoretical power is highly unlikely . . . ."). 
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medium-sized businesses.71  Should insured losses from a terrorist attack 
exceed the mandatory recovery point of $27.5 billion, insurance companies 
may be inadequately capitalized to cover losses beyond the mandatory 
recovery point.72  The likelihood that insurers may be inadequately 
capitalized following a terrorist attack is amplified by the fact that 
catastrophic terrorist attacks are clash events, creating correlated, industry-
wide losses across multiple coverage lines.73  
In addition, although the terrorism insurance market has softened since 
9/11, a second terrorism attack could significantly harden the insurance 
market.74  This hardening would make insurance for small- and medium-
sized businesses more expensive and less available.75  Market hardening 
might also come from other stressors, such as losses in other insurance 
sectors and the financial markets.76  Market hardening would compound 
terrorism insurance’s pricing and availability problems if the industry has to 
absorb a second large-scale attack.77  
Second, political pressures following a terrorist attack make it unlikely 
that the Secretary of the Treasury will exercise his discretionary power to 
require payments above the mandatory recoupment amount.78  Following 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See TRIPRA § 103(e)(7)(D) ("[T]he Secretary may recoup, through terrorism loss 
risk-spreading premiums, such additional amounts that the Secretary believes can be 
recouped . . . ." (emphasis added)). 
 72. See Brunet, supra note 11, at 26 ("While it is likely that the insurance industry 
could absorb the losses in most cases, there are some scenarios that could cripple the 
insurance industry."); Hartwig, supra note 7 ("The . . . insurance industry continues to lack 
the capacity and resources to cope with . . . large-scale terrorism."). 
 73. See, e.g., Hartwig, supra note 7 (enumerating 9/11 losses by insurance coverage 
lines).  Property losses accounted for 31.8% of insured losses, while business interruption 
accounted for 31.1%, aviation liability accounted for 11.1%, workers’ compensation 
accounted for 5.7%, life insurance accounted for 3.2%, event cancellation accounted for 
3.2%, aviation hull accounted for 1.6%, and other lines accounted for 12.7%.  Id. 
 74. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 11 ("[I]nsurers 
[respond] to catastrophic events by cutting back coverage significantly or substantially 
increasing premiums for policyholders.").  
 75. See id. ("[A]nother terrorist attack . . . could reduce the current supply of terrorism 
insurance coverage and increase pricing. . . .").  
 76. See id. at 12 ("[I]nsurers could suffer significant losses for a variety of [non-
terrorism-related] reasons, such as the costs of a large hurricane or earthquake or declines in 
the values of their investment portfolios, which might make them less willing to offer 
terrorism coverage under current terms and pricing."). 
 77. See id. at 11 (noting how a second terrorist attack, combined with a hardening of 
the insurance market, could cause insurers to significantly reduce coverage and increase 
prices). 
 78. See Manns, supra note 70, at 2535 (noting that political pressures following a 
terrorist attack would make it unlikely that the Secretary of the Treasury would require 
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9/11, the federal government responded to the plight of the uninsured and 
underinsured with the Victim Compensation Fund.79  This response seemed 
natural.80  Acts of senseless violence, and terrorism in particular, often 
create national unity.81  The public perception that 9/11 was due to a failure 
at the federal level put pressure on Congress to provide ex post relief,82 
especially for the uninsured and underinsured.83  Just as political pressures 
compelled the government to provide ex post relief to the uninsured and 
underinsured following 9/11,84 "political pressures from reelection-seeking 
politicians and rent-seeking beneficiaries" following a future terrorist attack 
will likely prevent the Secretary of the Treasury from recovering beyond 
the mandatory recoupment point.85  
TRIA’s recoupment method amplifies the unlikelihood of recoupment 
beyond the mandatory amount.  TRIA prescribes that the "Secretary may 
recoup [discretionary recovery amounts] through terrorism loss risk-
spreading premiums."86  Terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums 
                                                                                                                 
recovery of federal assistance paid out above the mandatory recovery point). 
 79. See Air Transportation and Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000)) 
[hereinafter ATSSS Act] (establishing the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund); see also Saul 
Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—and Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
268, 274 (2003) ("[T]he main motivation for the . . . Victim Compensation Fund . . . was the 
realization that many of the victims were un-insured or underinsured."). 
 80. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 79, at 278 (asserting that, given the nature of 
the 9/11 attacks, the creation of the Victim Compensation Fund was not surprising).  
 81. See id. at 279 ("Terrorism, after all, draws in the entire nation in a way that natural 
disasters do not. This is because an attack from abroad, including a pronouncement or 
history of animus toward the country as a whole, is seen as one aimed at the integrity or 
confidence of all citizens."). 
 82. See id. ("[P]art of what . . . motivated the Victim Compensation Fund was the 
feeling that the losses suffered on 9/11 were no different from losses caused by the attack of 
a foreign sovereign, . . . putting them in the category of losses appropriately addressed by the 
federal government.").  "This leap from failed protection to generous compensation may be 
primarily an emotional reaction rather than a logical [reaction], but it helps to explain the 
comfort with federal relief following 9/11."  Id. 
 83. See id. ("The other . . . factor that may lead to substantial government relief 
[following] terrorism-related disasters is the predictable pattern connecting uninsured losses, 
public sympathy, and government relief."). "This link builds on [this] fact:  [P]ublic 
sympathy following a disaster will . . . be more intense, and hence the political determination 
to provide relief funds will be greater, to the extent there are uninsured victims."  Id. 
 84. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text (explaining that political pressures 
caused by a mostly emotional reaction among the population following 9/11 made the 
Victim Compensation Fund seem like the natural consequence of perceived federal failings 
to prevent the attacks). 
 85. Manns, supra note 70, at 2535. 
 86. TRIPRA § 103(e)(7)(D). 
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"shall . . . be imposed as a policyholder premium surcharge on property and 
casualty insurance policies."87  Thus, TRIA passes the cost of discretionary 
recoupment on to insureds.88  The surcharge is determined at the Secretary 
of the Treasury’s discretion,89 but the surcharge "may not exceed . . . 3 
percent of the premium charged for property and casualty 
insurance . . . under the policy."90  The statute makes no distinction for 
those who declined terrorism coverage, so TRIA levies the surcharge on all 
commercial property and casualty insureds.91  TRIA, however, allows the 
Secretary of the Treasury to make adjustments in the surcharge depending 
on whether the insured assets are located in an urban or rural location.92  
This would shift recoupment costs from rural insureds to urban insureds.93  
Presumably, this provision was intended to encourage insureds to move 
from urban areas (perceived as high-risk) to rural areas (perceived as low-
risk), in an effort to limit potential losses.94  This would increase the cost of 
insurance for those most likely to elect coverage (those who perceive they 
need it), those with large assets in urban areas.95  These insureds already 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. § 103(e)(8)(A) (emphasis added). 
 88. See id. ("Any amount established by the Secretary as a terrorism loss risk-
spreading premium shall . . . be imposed as a policyholder premium surcharge on property 
and casualty insurance policies in force after the date of such establishment . . . ."). 
 89. See id. (explaining that the policyholder premium is "established by the 
Secretary"). 
 90. Id. § 103(e)(8)(C). 
 91. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 9 (explaining that the 
policyholder premium surcharge applies whether or not the insured carried terrorism 
coverage). 
 92. See TRIPRA § 103(e)(8)(D)(i) ("In determining the method and manner of 
imposing terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums, including the amount of such premiums, 
the Secretary shall [consider] (I) the economic impact on commercial centers of urban 
areas . . . and . . . (II) the risk factors related to rural areas and smaller commercial 
centers . . . .").  
 93. See id. (giving the Secretary of the Treasury discretion to shift the cost of 
recoupment to urban areas viewed as high risk). 
 94. See Boardman, supra note 3, at 820 (noting that the current terrorism risk is a 
correlated risk); Manns, supra note 70, at 2537–38 (noting the adverse selection problems 
created by subsidized terrorism insurance). 
 95. See MARSH, THE MARSH REPORT:  TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE 10 (2010), 
available at http://insurancemarketreport.com/terrorism2010/Home/tabid/7396/Default.aspx 
(explaining that the greater the total insured value of the asset, the greater the take-up rate of 
terrorism insurance); id. at 12 (providing terrorism insurance take-up rates by region).  In 
2009, take-up rates in the Northeast were 73%, for the South were 58%, for the Midwest 
were 60%, and for the West were 47%.  Id.; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION 
DENSITY BY STATES AND PUERTO RICO (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
opest/gallery/maps/pop_density2009.pdf (demonstrating that population density is greatest 
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face the highest terrorism insurance premiums.96  Given the population’s 
tendency to react emotionally rather than logically following an attack,97 it 
is likely a surcharge that would not be well received immediately following 
what will be perceived, most likely, as a federal failure.98  
To illustrate this point:  Assuming a future attack does strike a high-
risk, urban asset, and that any surcharge following such an attack would be 
greatest for those with high-risk, urban assets, the perception may be that 
the attack’s victims are being taxed.  On the other hand, should an attack 
strike a rural, lower risk target, the perception may be that a greater 
surcharge on rural insureds, who are less likely to carry terrorism coverage, 
is unfairly penal.  As demonstrated above, the population can have 
tremendous sympathy for the under- and uninsured following a terrorist 
attack.99  Conversely, if following an attack on rural, low risk targets, the 
surcharge is greatest on urban insureds (those most likely to carry terrorism 
coverage), the perception may be that the surcharge penalizes those who 
were socially responsible and elected to carry terrorism insurance.  In any 
of the above scenarios, the results seem fundamentally unfair.  A perception 
of unfairness will make it unlikely that the Secretary of the Treasury will 
elect to recover federal funds in excess of the mandatory recoupment 
amount.100  
                                                                                                                 
in the Northeast, Midwest, and South, in that order). 
 96. See MARSH, supra note 95, at 15 ("Companies in major metropolitan areas—New 
York, Washington, DC, and Boston, for example—are likely to pay a higher premium for 
their terrorism coverage . . . ."); see also TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra 
note 29, at 16 ("[O]wners of large, high-value properties in financial districts or downtown 
locations . . . face . . . challenges . . . obtaining coverage . . . .").  "[An insured] with 
large . . . properties in New York, San Francisco, and Chicago [found] only a few insurers 
were willing to offer coverage [that] it considered expensive and that only provided half of 
the $1.5 billion in coverage it sought."  Id. 
 97. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 79, at 279 (explaining the population’s 
emotional reaction following 9/11). 
 98. See id. (explaining that the U.S. population thought 9/11 was the result of a federal 
failure to prevent the attacks). 
 99. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting the population’s emotional 
reaction to the plight of the under- and uninsured following 9/11). 
 100. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 79, at 278 ("There is every reason to think that, 
in the event of another attack on U.S. soil, and especially one aimed at a civilian target, 
significant government-provided compensation would again be forthcoming.").  Given 
TRIA’s mandatory/discretionary recoupment line, such compensation could come in the 
form of unrecovered TRIA funds paid out in excess of the mandatory recoupment point.  See 
Manns, supra note 70, at 2534–35 (suggesting that the Secretary of the Treasury will forgive 
obligations to repay federal compensation exceeding the mandatory recoupment point). 
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Risk exposure modelers recognize the fact that recoupment beyond the 
mandatory recoupment amount is unlikely.101  As a result, modelers have 
excluded losses in excess of the mandatory recoupment amount from their 
loss models.102  Thus, the insurance industry recognizes that the mandatory 
recoupment amount sets a soft cap on loss exposure.103  This soft cap 
benefits both insureds and insurers.104  Currently, even if the Secretary of 
the Treasury decided to recoup federal funds paid in excess of the 
mandatory recoupment amount, the cost passes directly to insureds.105  
Without TRIA, this soft cap on industry losses would disappear, and 
insurers’ aggregate exposure would increase.106  Thus, insurers have no 
incentive to move to a position where they would be liable for the totality of 
insured losses.  This soft cap also provides the insurers with some certainty 
of total loss in the event of a terrorist attack.107  This certainty allows 
insurers to ensure that they are adequately capitalized and to hedge the 
remaining uncertainty by reducing exposure in high-risk areas.108  Thus, 
provisions limiting mandatory recovery, coupled with the fact that 
discretionary recovery is unlikely, provide insurers with strong incentives 
not to develop a private market for terrorism insurance.  
                                                                                                                 
 101. See, e.g., Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 9 (assuming that the 
Secretary of the Treasury will not exercise his discretionary power to require recoupment of 
federal funds paid in excess of the mandatory recoupment amount). 
 102. See id. (excluding discretionary recoupment amounts from their loss models). 
 103. See id. (recognizing that discretionary recoupment is unlikely). 
 104. See supra notes 63–100 and accompanying text (noting that, given the 
unlikelihood that the Secretary of the Treasury would require recovery beyond the 
mandatory recovery point, insurance industry losses would be capped at the mandatory 
recovery point). 
 105. See TRIPRA § 103(e)(8)(A) ("Any amount established by the Secretary as a 
terrorism loss risk-spreading premium shall . . . be imposed as a policyholder premium 
surcharge on property and casualty insurance policies in force after the date of such 
establishment . . . ."). 
 106. See, e.g., TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 16 
(explaining that insurers would respond to increased exposure in the absence of TRIA by 
significantly reducing coverage availability). 
 107. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 9 (assuming that discretionary 
recovery is unlikely and demonstrating that insurers can calculate their risk exposure in 
relation to their surplus). 
 108. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-919R, INITIAL RESULTS ON 
AVAILABILITY OF TERRORISM INSURANCE IN SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS 11 (2008) ("To 
mitigate their potential losses, many insurers set limits on the amount of coverage that they 
will provide to policyholders in confined geographic areas within a city, making obtaining 
coverage more difficult or costly for certain policyholders."). 
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With discretionary recovery unlikely, the cost to insureds is also 
reduced.109  Without TRIA, insurance industry exposure could theoretically 
be unlimited.110  The increased cost of this exposure would be passed on to 
insureds in the form of increased premiums and decreased coverage 
availability.111  Because it is unlikely that insureds would have to absorb the 
cost of discretionary recovery above the mandatory recoupment point under 
TRIA, they enjoy the benefits of lower premiums with minimal risk of 
additional cost.112  Thus, under TRIA, insureds have no incentive to demand 
a private market where industry losses are theoretically unlimited because 
the costs of increased industry exposure would pass to insurance 
consumers. 
B.  Large Insurers Can Game TRIA 
The soft cap on losses that TRIA provides allows large insurers to 
game TRIA.  Large insurers are able to maximize premiums collected from 
insureds while maintaining minimum loss exposure.113  This provides 
insurers offering the most coverage with little incentive to create a private 
market.114 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text (noting the benefits and lower costs 
insureds enjoy under TRIA due to the soft cap on losses created by the 
mandatory/discretionary recoupment provisions). 
 110. See Boardman, supra note 3, at 787 (noting private reinsurers are unwilling to 
provide reinsurance for terrorism losses). 
 111. See, e.g., Snow, supra note 51 (explaining that should TRIA expire, insurers could 
react to increased risk exposure in a variety of ways, including raising premiums); 
TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 11 ("[T]he amount of 
terrorism coverage [insurers] provide would decline—by more than 95 percent for one 
insurer—without . . . TRIA . . . ."). 
 112. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 4 ("Many 
industry participants and policyholders said that terrorism insurance currently is available 
nationwide at prices viewed as reasonable, and they cited the TRIA program . . . for these 
generally favorable conditions."); see also supra notes 63–100 and accompanying text 
(reasoning that it is unlikely the additional cost of discretionary recovery would be passed on 
to insureds). 
 113. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 23–29 (noting how large 
insurers can game TRIA). 
 114. See infra notes 115–44 and accompanying text (noting that the largest insurers 
have little incentive to move to a private terrorism market because of their ability to game 
TRIA). 
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Each insurer’s ability to game TRIA depends on each insurer’s ratio of 
its TRIA deductible and surplus.115  The deductible each insurer must pay is 
determined by the premiums each insurer collects from its TRIA lines of 
insurance.116  An insurer’s surplus is that insurer’s net worth (assets minus 
liabilities).117  An insurer’s loss following a terrorist attack depends on its 
deductible for that program year.118  Large insurers with lots of earned 
premiums across various TRIA and non-TRIA lines of insurance have 
lower deductible to surplus ratios.119 
Insurers with high TRIA deductibles relative to their surpluses are 
more exposed to losses following a certified terrorist attack.120  Conversely, 
large insurers with low deductibles relative to their surpluses are less 
exposed to losses and have a greater incentive to offer terrorism coverage 
because their losses will be minimal.121  Assume that each insurer wants to 
limit its aggregate exposure following a terrorist attack to 10% of its 
surplus.  Because the mandatory/discretionary recoupment point sets a soft 
cap on industry losses,122 insurers can calculate what amount of insurance 
they can offer to limit their losses to 10% of their surplus.123  Insurers with 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 23 ("An insurer with a very low 
deductible/surplus ratio would have [an incentive] . . . to take advantage of the small 
percentage [of insured losses] it would have to absorb if its loss exceeds the TRIA 
deductible."). 
 116. See TRIPRA § 102(7)(F) (establishing the "insurer deductible" for each insurer as 
20% of each insurer’s prior year’s "direct earned premiums"); id. § 102(4) (defining "direct 
earned premium" as "direct earned premium for property and casualty insurance issued by 
any insurer for insurance against losses occurring at the locations described in subparagraphs 
(A) and (B) of paragraph (5)"). 
 117. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that an insurer’s 
surplus "represents the net worth of the company (assets minus liabilities)"). 
 118. See id. ("Given the obligation of insurers to offer terrorism insurance to all their 
commercial policyholders under TRIA, the amount of loss that an insurer will eventually 
bear is based on its deductible."). 
 119. See id. at 25 (noting that larger insurers with "considerable business in non-TRIA 
lines" will have high surpluses relative to their TRIA deductibles).  The top thirty insurers 
cover 70% of the entire insurance market.  Id. at 12.  The top 23 insurers also account for 
over 2/3 of TRIA-lines insurance coverage.  Id. at 25. 
 120. See id. at 10 ("[T]he larger an insurer’s Deductible/Surplus (D/S) ratio, the more 
exposed the insurer is to losses from any given terrorist attack."). 
 121. See id. at 25 (noting that insurers with low deductibles relative to their surpluses 
will take advantage of TRIA’s provisions by increasing the terrorism coverage they offer). 
 122. See supra notes 62–100 and accompanying text (noting the soft cap on insurer 
losses facilitated by TRIA’s mandatory/discretionary recoupment provisions); see also 
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 9 (conceding it is unlikely that recovery above 
the mandatory recoupment point would be required). 
 123. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 25 (noting that insurers can 
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deductible to surplus ratios greater than or equal to 0.1 will have to limit 
their exposure to current levels or cut back coverage—if they are able—so 
that their ratios are 0.1.124  Insurers with deductible to surplus ratios less 
than 0.1 will be able to game TRIA to offer more coverage.125  These 
insurers can offer more terrorism coverage at lower prices until their 
deductible to surplus ratios reach 0.1.126  This would increase the take-up 
rate of terrorism insurance among insureds.127  The greater the take-up rate, 
the less insurers will ultimately pay following a terrorist attack.128  This is 
because under TRIA, a small number of large insurers would pay a small 
fraction of insured losses.129  Without a soft cap on losses, insurers are not 
able to game TRIA, and a large number of insurers would each pay a 
limited fraction of the total insured losses because they would limit 
aggregate exposure to 10% of surplus.130 Collectively, they would pay more 
than if large insurers could game TRIA.131  Howard Kunreuther and Erwann 
Michel-Kerjan demonstrated this using TRIA’s provisions for the 2005 
program year.132  Assuming a $25 billion loss in New York City and a take-
up rate of 50%, the total amount of insured losses would be approximately 
$17.5 billion.133  The insurance industry, in the aggregate, would pay $13.3 
billion of those losses.134  If large insurers are able to game TRIA and 
increase take-up rates to 100%, the total insured loss would be $25 
                                                                                                                 
adjust coverage amounts to limit their exposure to a specified amount of surplus). 
 124. See id. ("For insurers with a [deductible to surplus] ratio greater than [0.1], 
insurers limit their exposure to 10 percent of their surplus."). 
 125. See id. ("Those with [a deductible to surplus ratio less than 0.1] could offer much 
more coverage . . . , particularly those with very small [deductible to surplus ratio] . . . ."). 
 126. See id. at 26 ("Insures with [deductible to surplus ratios less than 0.1] are willing 
to write considerably more property coverage at relatively low prices."). 
 127. See id. (noting that the more coverage offered at lower prices, the greater the take-
up rate of terrorism insurance among insureds). 
 128. See id. at 27 (noting that as insurers’ take-up rates increase, "insurers will pay less 
for terrorism losses"). 
 129. See id. (noting that a "few insurers will end up paying a very limited portion of 
their exposure"). 
 130. See id. (noting that if insurers were not able to game TRIA, "losses would have 
been spread over a much larger number of insurers"). 
 131. See id. (noting that if insurers were unable to game TRIA, their aggregate losses 
would be greater). 
 132. See id. at 28 tbl.4 (analyzing loss sharing under simulated terrorist attacks using 
2005 program-year data). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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billion.135  Under this scenario, insurers would only pay $8.4 billion.136  
Assuming a $100 billion loss, the maximum covered by TRIA, and a take-
up rate of 50%, the total insured loss would be $75 billion.137  Insurers 
would cover $24 billion of this loss.138 With a take-up rate of 100%, the 
total insured loss would be $100 billion.139  Insurers would only pay $20.7 
billion of this loss, with the balance—$79.3 billion—covered by 
taxpayers.140 
The ability of large insurers to game the system by increasing 
coverage availability and take-up rates demonstrates an inequity in TRIA.141  
Large insurers have a tremendous incentive to take advantage of TRIA’s 
provisions.142  The twenty-three largest insurers provide most terrorism 
coverage143 and will pay only a small portion of their aggregate exposure 
following a terrorist attack.144  Thus, under TRIA, the insurers providing the 
most coverage have no incentive to move towards a private terrorism 
insurance market. 
C.  Lack of Information Sharing 
One of TRIA’s largest shortcomings is that it does not provide for 
public/private information sharing.145  To insure a risk, insurance 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. at 28 (noting the inequity the ability to game TRIA creates). 
 142. See id. at 23 ("Any insurer with a low deductible/surplus (D/S) ratio would have 
an economic incentive to write a large number of policies in a concentrated area subject to a 
terrorist attack (e.g., Times Square, Wall Street area) due to the positive correlation in these 
losses."). 
 143. See id. at 25 (noting that the twenty-three largest insurers account for over 2/3 of 
the coverage provided under TRIA insurance lines). 
 144. See id. at 28 (noting that large insurers able to game TRIA will "pay very little 
after a terrorist attack compared with their aggregate exposure"). 
 145. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GOOD PRACTICES FOR 
MITIGATING AND FINANCING CATASTROPHIC RISK 3 (2010) [hereinafter OECD] (noting the 
necessity of information sharing among industry participants and insurance consumers for 
dealing with catastrophic risk); Brunet, supra note 11, at 26 ("Difficulties . . . surround the 
acquisition of data—and particularly classified as well as privately held data—that is 
required to price terrorism risk insurance and mitigation measures."); Alexia Brunet Marks, 
Under Attack: Terrorism Risk Insurance Regulation, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 387, 440 (2011) ("The 
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companies must be able to:  (1) assess the probability and magnitude of 
losses and (2) set premiums to account for the risk of loss.146  Typically, the 
probability and magnitude of losses, and the premiums that correspond to 
such losses, are estimated with risk modeling.147  A number of risk 
modelers have developed models for assessing terrorism risk,148 but 
terrorism is particularly hard to model,149 and insurers are wary of the 
available terrorism models.150  The risk posed by terrorism is a 
"combination of possessing the intent and capability to exploit vulnerability 
in an asset (threat), identifying a weakness in an asset that can be exploited 
(vulnerability), and causing physical, mental, and societal losses resulting 
from an attack (consequence)."151  The nature of this risk makes it 
challenging to calculate.152  Although calculating an attack’s consequences 
                                                                                                                 
federal government is unique in its ability to gather terrorism-related information."); Manns, 
supra note 70, at 2516 ("[T]errorism insurers suffer from a significant lack of available 
information to make determinations on the probability . . . and . . . potential magnitude of 
terrorist attacks.").  
 146. See Brunet, supra note 11, at 10 ("A risk is determined insurable when one is able 
to: (1) identify the risk and assess and quantify, or partially estimate, the probability and 
magnitude of losses and (2) feasibly set premiums for each potential customer or class of 
customers which reflect the risk."). 
 147. See id. at 10–11 ("Insurers and reinsurers use computer modeling as a tool to 
assess risk—to predict potential future losses. . . .  Computer models that [assess] risk in a 
portfolio of exposures . . . also help the insurer decide how much reinsurance to purchase 
and what price to charge policyholders."). 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 14 ("[T]hree proprietary catastrophe modeling firms with wide 
expertise in natural catastrophe modeling have developed terrorism risk models for insurers:  
The Insurance Service Office’s (ISO) subsidiary AIR Worldwide Corporation (AIR), [Risk 
Management Solutions], and EQECAT (EQE)."). 
 149. See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 3, at 817 ("[B]uilding a model for the American 
terrorism risk is more akin to free verse poetry than mathematics."). 
 150. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 18 
("Insurers . . . noted that they are not as comfortable with the estimates of the probability, or 
frequency, of an attack, from these models and, therefore, make more limited use of this 
information."); see also Boardman, supra note 3, at 817 ("Even those who attempt modeling 
agree that ‘there is a lack of adequate historical data to support estimates of catastrophic 
[terrorism] losses, [and] the traditional methods for . . . estimating risk are not suitable to 
assess possible terrorism exposures, predict losses, [or] identify adequate rates and loss 
costs.’" (quoting NAT’L COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INS., INC., IMPLEMENTING THE 
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 (2002))).  As a result, "The evidence to date 
suggests that insurers are either guessing what price to charge for terrorism coverage or 
strategically pricing to avoid [the risk of terrorism losses] altogether."  Id. at 819. 
 151. Brunet, supra note 11, at 13. 
 152. See id. 13–14 ("[C]alculating [terrorism] risk is computationally challenging 
inasmuch as the nature of terrorism as a ‘low-probability, high-consequence’ event, making 
it difficult to estimate the chance that an event will occur and the consequences related to it." 
(quoting ROBERT E. CHAPMAN & CHI J. LENG, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND 
TERROR CATs 1845 
is difficult,153 the greatest challenge is estimating the probability that a 
terrorist attack will occur.154 
To better evaluate terrorism risk, insurers need more information on 
the potential magnitude of future attacks and the probability that such 
attacks will occur.155  Traditional lines of insurance coverage thrive on 
information sharing between market participants.156  Information on 
terrorism risk potential is asymmetrical.157  The entity with the greatest 
ability to assess terrorism risk, the federal government,158 is not sharing its 
assessments with private insurers.159  TRIA could have provided for 
information sharing between the federal government and the insurance 
industry, but it did not.160  Without public/private information sharing, 
insurers will only be able to create a private market for terrorism insurance 
if domestic terrorist attacks become so frequent that there is sufficient data 
to calculate the probability and magnitude of future attacks.161  No one 
would contend that such a condition is attractive or tenable.  
                                                                                                                 
TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 7073, COST EFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO TERRORIST 
RISKS IN CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES 2 (2004))). 
 153. See Manns, supra note 70, at 2516 ("[T]errorism insurers . . . face difficulties in 
estimating the potential magnitude of terrorist attacks."). 
 154. See Brunet, supra note 11, at 14 ("[T]he strategic challenge with regards to risk 
assessment is . . . in estimating the likelihood or probability of these attacks." (citations 
omitted)). 
 155. See Brunet, supra note 11, at 26 ("Difficulties . . . surround the acquisition of 
data—particularly classified as well as privately held data—that is required to price 
terrorism risk insurance and mitigation measures."); Manns, supra note 70, at 2516 
("[T]errorism insurers suffer from a significant lack of available information to make 
determinations on the probability . . . and . . . potential magnitude of terrorist attacks."). 
 156. See Brunet, supra note 11, at 26 ("[T]raditional insurance assumes that emerging 
issue information is available and shared . . . ."). 
 157. See id. ("[I]n the case of terrorism modeling, information sharing is 
asymmetric’ . . . ."). 
 158. See Brunet Marks, supra note 145 (stating that, with respect to terrorism, the 
federal government has an "information advantage"). 
 159. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text (explaining that the federal 
government is not sharing the information it has on terrorism risks). 
 160. See Brunet, supra note 11, at 26 (acknowledging that classified terrorism 
information cannot be shared and, therefore, differs from traditional insurance information). 
 161. See Boardman, supra note 3, at 785 ("While the sheer possibility of using actuarial 
data for the terrorism risk exists, the possibility will only be realized if terrorist attacks 
become much more frequent . . . ."). 
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D.  TRIA Creates Regulatory Certainty 
A fourth reason TRIA failed to encourage an independent private 
market response is that TRIA provides a measure of national uniformity 
that is attractive to insurers.  Although states are primarily responsible for 
regulating terrorism insurance,162  TRIA preempts state law on two 
important issues.163  First, TRIA mandates that certain insurers cover 
terrorism losses.164  Second, TRIA requires that terrorism coverage be made 
available on terms similar to general property and casualty coverage.165 
Returning to a terrorism insurance regime regulated entirely by the 
states would be costly for insurers and insureds.  Following 9/11, and prior 
to TRIA, states reacted differently to the new terrorism threat.166  Should 
TRIA be allowed to expire without a federal alternative to replace it, 
insurers would return to a fifty state regulatory regime for terrorism 
insurance.  Such a regime would lead to coverage uncertainties.  First, some 
states might allow insurers to exclude terrorism coverage.167  If states allow 
insurers to exclude terrorism coverage, then insurers will exclude terrorism 
coverage.168  This would create uncertainty as to whether terrorism 
coverage is available in each state.169  Second, if terrorism insurance 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See JOHN DEMBECK, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE 
LAW: INSURANCE REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL art. 1, § 1.05 (2008) (explaining that states 
retain "the primary responsibility for insurance regulation"). 
 163. See TRIPRA § 105(a)–(b) (preempting state law). 
 164. See id. § 103(c)(1)(A) ("[E]ach entity that meets the definition of an insurer under 
section 102 . . . shall make available, in all of its property and casualty insurance policies, 
coverage for insured [terrorism] losses . . . ."). 
 165. See id. § 103(c)(1)(B) ("[E]ach entity that meets the definition of an insurer under 
section 102 . . . shall make available property and casualty insurance coverage for insured 
[terrorism] losses that does not differ materially from the terms, amounts, and other coverage 
limitations applicable to losses arising from events other than acts of terrorism."). 
 166. See HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 5 (explaining that following 9/11 and prior to 
TRIA, forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands approved terrorism 
exclusions for commercial property and casualty insurers).  The five states that did not allow 
terrorism exclusions account for 35% of the commercial insurance market.  Id. 
 167. See id. (noting coverage differences between the states before TRIA). 
 168. See Denise Trowbridge, Future of Terrorism Insurance Is at Risk:  Law that Caps 
Losses, Helps Fund Policies Will Expire in ‘07, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 26, 2006, at 1F 
("The only reason we offer [terrorism insurance] now is because we have to . . . ." (quoting 
Christopher Timm, President of Century Insurance Group, a division of ProCentury)); see 
also Reiter, supra note 25, at 253 ("[I]nsurers have written ‘springing exclusions’ into their 
new policies, automatically voiding terrorism coverage should Congress allow TRIEA to 
sunset.  The largest risk inherent in the private market solution is that insurers will decide to 
abandon terrorism insurance altogether, and . . . this is almost a certainty."). 
 169. See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text (explaining that if given the option, 
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providers could differ the terms of their terrorism coverage from the terms 
of their general property and casualty policies, then insurers and insureds 
would be faced with uncertainties as to what extent insured assets are 
covered based on threat type (i.e., weather or terrorism).170  These 
uncertainties about policy differences for general property and casualty 
coverage, and terrorism coverage, would be compounded by differences 
between states.  Coverage uncertainties increase the transaction costs for 
risk-averse insureds with national asset portfolios.171  Coverage 
uncertainties also increase transaction costs for insurers and reinsurers 
seeking to reduce their risk exposure by diversifying their risk portfolios.172  
Greater transaction costs make providing terrorism insurance less 
attractive to insurers.173  Low transaction costs make insurance attractive 
and feasible for both insurers and insureds.174  As transaction costs increase, 
insurance becomes less attractive and harder to provide.175  Thus, by 
creating a greater level of coverage certainty than a terrorism insurance 
regime regulated entirely by states,176  TRIA minimizes transaction costs 
for both insureds and insurers.177  This provides insureds and insurers with 
little incentive to create a private market for terrorism insurance. 
                                                                                                                 
insurers would exclude terrorism insurance, but some states were not willing to allow 
insurers to exclude coverage before TRIA preempted state law on this issue).  
 170. See TRIPRA § 103(c)(2) (noting that insurers cannot materially vary the terms of 
their terrorism coverage from the terms of its non-terrorism coverage). 
 171. See Clay H. Kaminsky, The Rome II Regulation:  A Comparative Perspective on 
Federalizing Choice of Law, 85 TUL. L. REV. 55, 79 (2010) (explaining that the greater the 
certainty of the applicable law, the lower the transaction costs for market participants). 
 172. See id. at 77–82 (explaining that the greater the consistency of the applicable law 
between various jurisdictions, the lower the transaction costs for market participants).  
 173. See Harry N. Bulter & Larry E. Ribstein, The Single-License Solution, 31 REG. 36, 
38 (2008) (explaining that the current state-based regulatory structure is plagued with 
"longstanding problems of duplication and overregulation" which in turn "undercuts 
insurers’ ability to achieve economies of scale").  "Forcing firms to comply with regulations 
that differ from state to state increases costs, limits product innovation and rate competition, 
and inhibits companies from exiting jurisdictions that impose burdensome regulation."  Id. at 
36. 
 174. Daniel J. Dudek & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Joint Implementation, Transaction 
Costs, and Climate Change, OECD, 16 (1996), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/33/ 
2392058.pdf ("The most obvious impact of transaction costs is that they raise the costs (and 
hence, lower the net benefit) to each participant of the prospective exchange."). 
 175. See id. ("Where the transaction costs exceed the benefits to a participant of 
engaging in the transaction, that person (if economically rational) will not participate."). 
 176. See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text (highlighting coverage 
uncertainties a completely state regulated terrorism insurance regime would produce). 
 177. See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text (highlighting the costs of greater 
coverage uncertainty). 
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E.  Insurers Believe They Can Rely on Traditional Coverage Exclusions 
An additional shortcoming of TRIA is that it does not limit insurers’ 
ability to rely on traditional nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological 
weapons (NBCR) coverage exclusions.178  Although TRIA voided terrorism 
exclusions that commercial property and casualty insurers had included in 
their policies following 9/11,179 insurers continue to include traditional 
NBCR exclusions in their policies.180  State regulators have approved these 
exclusions.181  Although NBCR coverage is available, it is generally only 
available in stand-alone policies at prices insureds consider too 
expensive.182 
The exclusion of NBCR losses following a terrorist attack would come 
at a great cost for insurers.183  Like any other coverage exclusion, NBCR 
exclusions will be litigated by insurers and insureds.184  There are huge 
transaction costs associated with litigating coverage exclusions.185  In the 
context of terrorism losses, transaction costs will be especially high due to 
the amount at stake and the fact that traditional NBCR exclusions were not 
intended to exclude terrorism losses.186  Under TRIA, insurers are able to 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  NBCR COVERAGE, supra note 53, at 10 (noting that 
TRIA does not require insurers to provide NBCR coverage or prohibit NBCR exclusions). 
 179. See TRIPRA § 105(a)–(b) ("Any terrorism exclusion in a contract for property and 
casualty insurance . . . shall be void to the extent that it excludes losses that would otherwise 
be insured losses. . . .  Any state approval of any terrorism exclusion from a contract for 
property and casualty insurance . . . shall be void. . . ."). 
 180. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  NBCR COVERAGE, supra note 53, at 4 ("[M]ost 
commercial property/casualty insurers . . . continue to exclude coverage for terrorist attacks 
involving NBCR materials . . . ."). 
 181. See id. at 14 ("Insurance companies seek to limit their coverage for NBCR risks by 
relying on long-standing exclusions for nuclear and pollution risks, which already have been 
approved by state regulators."). 
 182. See id. (noting that NBCR coverage is available in stand-alone terrorism policies, 
but the high prices of such policies keeps demand at a minimum). 
 183. See Jeffery E. Thomas, Exclusion of Terrorist-Related Harms from Insurance 
Coverage: Do the Costs Justify the Benefits?, 36 IND. L. REV. 397, 398 (2003) 
("[T]ransaction costs associated with terrorism exclusions will be . . . great . . . ."). 
 184. See id. at 407 (noting that because exclusion would provide a complete defense, 
both insurers and insureds have tremendous incentives to litigate NBCR exclusions). 
 185. See id. at 411 (noting the transaction costs involved in litigating coverage 
exclusions for both insurers and insureds). 
 186. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  NBCR COVERAGE, supra note 53, at 15 (noting that 
NBCR exclusions were not developed for the purposes of excluding terrorism-related 
losses); Thomas, supra note 183, at 407 (noting that the amount at stake, the vagueness and 
ill-fit of NBCR exclusions for terrorism losses, and factual uncertainties will increase 
transaction costs for all parties). 
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easily calculate the costs and benefits of litigating coverage exclusions.  
Because insurers can be assured that TRIA provides a soft cap on their 
losses,187 and that the federal government, as a reinsurer, will not litigate the 
exclusions with the primary insurers, the cost of litigating these exclusions 
is much lower under TRIA.188  Without TRIA, insurers would litigate the 
NBCR exclusions and still face possible liability for the entire covered 
loss.189  Additionally, reinsurers, free from state regulation, continue to 
exclude NBCR from their reinsurance coverage.190  Without TRIA, insurers 
would have to litigate NBCR exclusions against reinsurers protected with 
more generous exclusions.191  Finally, if TRIA ends, then states could 
prohibit exclusions for NBCR terrorism losses.192  Should this happen, 
insurers would not only be unable to exclude such losses from their 
policies, they also would have difficulties obtaining reinsurance coverage 
because reinsurers could continue to exclude such losses.193  Thus, insurers’ 
potential liability and the transaction costs of litigating NBCR exclusions 
will be greater without TRIA.194  These costs provide insurers with little 
incentive to establish a private market without federal reinsurance. 
                                                                                                                 
 187. See supra Part III.A and accompanying text (noting the soft cap on losses that 
insurers enjoy under TRIA). 
 188. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  NBCR COVERAGE, supra note 53, at 10 (noting that 
although Congress did not preempt NBCR exclusions, Congress does wish for NBCR-
related terrorism losses to be covered under TRIA). 
 189. See Thomas, supra note 183, at 398 (noting that without TRIA, "transaction costs 
associated with the terrorism exclusions will be so great that they will seriously erode, and 
perhaps outweigh, the benefits to be derived"). 
 190. See TERRORISM INSURANCE: NBCR COVERAGE, supra note 53, at 10 ("[R]einsurers 
generally do not offer or strictly limit NBCR coverage because of the uncertainties about the 
risk and the potential for catastrophic losses . . . ."). 
 191. See Thomas, supra note 183, at 407 (noting the incentives insured (primary 
insurers) and insurers (reinsurers) have to litigate exclusions following a terrorist attack). 
 192. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  NBCR COVERAGE, supra note 53, at 15 (noting that 
traditional state-approved NBCR exclusions were not intended as terrorism exclusions); 
HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 5 (noting that following 9/11, some states, accounting for 35% of 
the commercial property and casualty market, refused to allow insurers to exclude terrorism-
related losses from their policies). 
 193. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  NBCR COVERAGE, supra note 53, at 12 ("Reinsurers 
generally are not required to obtain state regulatory approval for the terms of coverage or the 
prices they charge."). 
 194. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text (noting the costs of litigating 
terrorism exclusions without TRIA reinsurance). 
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F.  TRIA Displaces Traditional Private Reinsurance 
Because TRIA has displaced private reinsurers, the private reinsurance 
market has not developed to respond to terrorism risk.195  Congress created 
TRIA to provide terrorism reinsurance because private reinsurance was 
unavailable.196  TRIA has been successful in closing this gap, but it has left 
little room for private reinsurance to respond to terrorism risk.197  In the 
absence of TRIA, there would be insufficient private reinsurance to support 
primary insurers.198  As a result, primary insurance would be prohibitively 
expensive or unavailable.199 
Under TRIA, the role of private reinsurance is limited.200  Private 
reinsurers provide coverage to close TRIA’s coverage gaps.201  Although 
these gaps can be significant, they amount to a small portion of primary 
insurers’ total exposure.202  To realize a private market response to 
terrorism risk, the private reinsurance market must take a larger role in 
shouldering terrorism risk.203 
IV.  Why Continuing Under TRIA in Its Current Form Is Not Attractive 
Given that TRIA has failed to generate the private market response 
that Congress intended,204 and because TRIA contributed to this 
                                                                                                                 
 195. See Marré, supra note 32, at 154 ("[A] private reinsurance market has failed to 
develop . . . ."). 
 196. See Boardman, supra note 3, at 786–87 (noting that after 9/11, private reinsurance 
was unavailable). 
 197. See The Terrorism Risk Insurance Program:  Hearing Before the Terrorism 
Insurance Implementation Working Group of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, 109th Cong. 73 (2006) [hereinafter Nutter] (statement of Franklin W. 
Nutter, President of Reinsurance Ass’n of Am.) ("[TRIA] is working well to fill a vacuum in 
reinsurance capacity . . . ."). 
 198. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 20 (noting the 
limited availability of private terrorism reinsurance). 
 199. See id. at 21–22 (noting how the availability of private reinsurance impacts the 
cost and availability of primary insurance). 
 200. See Nutter, supra note 197 (noting the role of private reinsurance under TRIA). 
 201. See id. (noting that private reinsurers cover the gaps in reinsurance coverage under 
TRIA). 
 202. See TRIPRA § 103(e)(1)(A) (providing that the federal share of insured losses is 
85% above the insurer deductible). 
 203. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 20 
("Reinsurance plays a crucial role in insurance markets."). 
 204. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting TRIA’s failure to encourage a 
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failure,205 it is time to look for solutions beyond TRIA.206  That the private 
reinsurance market has also failed to develop reinforces the need to pursue 
alternatives.207 
Continually renewing TRIA has been costly for taxpayers and market 
participants.  Until 2009, when Congress extended TRIA for five years, 
Congress revisited TRIA biannually.208  This amounted to a great 
expenditure of time and energy at taxpayer expense.209  Congress will have 
to expend this energy again in 2014, and thereafter, if it continues to renew 
TRIA.210  The continuance of a federal terrorism reinsurance program is 
necessary because the private market has failed to respond; therefore, 
renewal in 2014 is likely to occur.211  Continually renewing TRIA has 
caused great uncertainty among insurers and reinsurers.212  Rather than 
acting to generate a long-term response, insurers are prepared to exclude 
coverage as soon as federal reinsurance is unavailable.213  This uncertainty 
has caused greater transaction costs for both insurers and insureds.214 
Because TRIA was originally intended to be temporary,215 TRIA put a 
large potential burden on the federal government.216  This short-term burden 
                                                                                                                 
private market response to terrorism risk). 
 205. See supra Part III and accompanying text (noting how TRIA contributed to its own 
failure to provide a private market response to terrorism risk). 
 206. See Reiter, supra note 25, at 263–64 (arguing that it is time for a long-term 
alternative to TRIA). 
 207. See Marré, supra note 32, at 154 (stating that a private reinsurance market has not 
developed). 
 208. See Reiter, supra note 25, at 264 (noting that Congress has had to continually 
revisit the TRIA). 
 209. See id. (noting the cost continually revisiting TRIA has had on taxpayers). 
 210. See TRIPRA § 108(a) (noting that TRIA will expire at the end of 2014). 
 211. See Reiter, supra note 25, at 264 (noting the continued necessity of TRIA). 
 212. See id. (noting the uncertainty the lack of a long-term solution creates for 
insurers). 
 213. See id. at 253 (noting the steps insurers are taking to ensure they can discontinue 
coverage for terrorism as soon as possible following the expiration of TRIA). 
 214. See J. David Cummins, CAT Bonds and Other Risk-Linked Securities:  State of the 
Market and Recent Developments, 11 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 23, 24–26 (2008) (noting the 
costs associated with renegotiating insurance contracts each year); Kaminsky, supra note 
171, at 79 (noting the transaction costs associated with uncertainty in the law); Reiter, supra 
note 25, at 253 (noting that insurers are continually revisiting policies as they become due so 
they can immediately exclude terrorism coverage should TRIA expire). 
 215. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that TRIA was intended as a 
temporary response to terrorism risk). 
 216. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-300(I), at 14 (2001) (noting that given the weakness and 
uncertainty in the insurance industry following 9/11, the federal government should bear the 
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has become a long-term burden,217 and TRIA has failed to shift this burden 
away from the federal government and taxpayers.218 TRIA creates a number 
of other inequities as well.219  As long as TRIA is continuously renewed, it 
will continue to suppress the private market response that Congress hoped 
to encourage, self-perpetuating its own necessity and the inequities it 
creates.220  A new solution is needed to reduce this potential burden on 
taxpayers and create greater certainty for market participants by providing a 
long-term federal response that shifts costs back to the private market. 
V.  Proposed Alternatives to TRIA 
Because TRIA has failed to facilitate the private market response that 
Congress hoped to encourage, market participants have proposed a number 
of alternatives to TRIA.  These alternatives include altering the tax code to 
allow insurers to increase their surplus221 and creating insurance pools to 
provide greater coverage capacity through economies of scale.222 
A.  Alteration of the Tax Code to Allow Insurers to Build Additional 
Reserves 
Industry participants have called for alteration of the tax code to allow 
insurers to increase their tax-deductible reserves.223  Currently, insurers may 
                                                                                                                 
burden of providing liquidity to the insurance industry in the short-term until the private 
market can revive and respond); Snow, supra note 51 ("TRIA represents a form of publicly-
provided and subsidized terrorism risk reinsurance, which essentially transfers risks 
associated with terrorism losses from the private to the public sector (taxpayers).").  
 217. See TRIPRA § 108(a) (noting that TRIA will expire at the end of 2014, meaning 
that TRIA has already continued for nine years longer than originally intended). 
 218. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 28 (noting the potential burden 
on taxpayers); Snow, supra note 51. 
 219. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 28 (noting an "inequity in the 
system, because policyholders . . . who do not suffer any loss [may be] responsible for the 
same amount of repayment to the government . . . as are policyholders . . . that suffered large 
losses and were subsidized by the government."); see also Manns, supra note 70, at 2536–38 
(noting how TRIA exacerbates moral hazard and adverse selection problems). 
 220. See supra Part III (noting how TRIA contributed to its own failure to encourage a 
private market response to terrorism risk). 
 221. See infra Part V.A (discussing proposals that Congress alter the tax code). 
 222. See infra Part V.B (discussing proposals that insurers create insurance pools for 
terrorism insurance). 
 223. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 24–26 
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create tax-deductible reserves for "fair and reasonable estimates" of future 
losses.224  Terrorism risk, however, is uncertain,225 and reserves set aside to 
cover future terrorism losses would not be tax deductible.226 
Proponents of alterations to the tax code believe that allowing insurers to 
establish tax-deductible reserves for terrorism losses could encourage a private 
market response to terrorism risk.227  They argue that allowing insurers to 
increase their tax-deductible reserves provides insurers with an incentive to 
increase their surplus and create greater coverage capacity.228  In addition, 
proponents believe that greater insurer surpluses will allow insurers to reduce 
terrorism insurance premiums, and thus, increase take-up rates among potential 
insureds.229  Allowing insurers to increase their reserves would also reduce the 
risk of insurer insolvencies following a large-scale attack.230 
The federal government, however, is reluctant to alter the tax code’s 
restrictions on insurers’ tax-deductible reserves.  The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) argues that allowing insurers to increase their tax-deductible 
reserves will not solve the problem of loss uncertainty, and insurers will not be 
able to accurately predict what amount of capital to set aside or how to 
                                                                                                                 
(outlining the strengths and weaknesses of the insurance industry’s proposal to loosen the 
tax code to allow insurers to increase their tax-deductible reserves). 
 224. See id. at 24. 
 225. See Boardman, supra note 3, at 785 (noting that given the current state of the 
information available on terrorist attacks, it is impossible to calculate the frequency or 
consequences of terrorist attacks so that the risk may be adequately priced). 
 226. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 24–25 
("Because the size and timing of terrorist attacks are uncertain, any reserves set aside for 
potential terrorism losses would be taxed as corporate income in the year in which they were 
set aside."). 
 227. See id. at 25–26 (noting how the insurance industry believes alterations in the tax 
code could help encourage a private market response by increasing reserves and lowering 
terrorism insurance premiums for insureds); see also Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra 
note 5, at 31 (noting that current federal tax policy impedes private market insurance 
arrangements). 
 228. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 25 
("[P]ermitting insurers to establish tax-deductible reserves could provide insurers with . . . 
incentives to increase their capital and expand their capacity . . . .").  
 229. See id. ("[E]stablishing [greater] reserves would lower costs [of] providing 
coverage and encourage insurers to charge lower premiums, which could increase coverage 
among policyholders."); see also Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 31 ("[T]ax-
deferred reserves for terrorism coverage . . . should increase supply and reduce premium 
rates."). 
 230. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 25 
("[E]stablish[ing] tax-deductible reserves [for terrorism losses] . . . could help prevent 
insurer insolvencies in the wake of an attack."). 
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price premiums.231  Additionally, the GAO is skeptical that allowing 
insurers to increase their reserves will increase terrorism insurance 
availability.  The GAO worries that because private reinsurance is 
limited,232 insurers will rely on their reserves as reinsurance and forgo 
outside reinsurance.233  Allowing insurers to increase their tax-deductible 
reserves to cover uncertain losses also creates opportunities for abuse.  The 
GAO is concerned that insurers will use the reserves for inappropriate tax 
and accounting purposes.234  Finally, allowing insurers to increase their tax-
deductible reserves would decrease federal tax revenues.235 
B.  Creation of Terrorism Insurance Pools 
A second proposal is modeled after Pool Re, the United Kingdom’s 
response to terrorism risk.236  The proposal involves creating insurance 
pools to increase coverage capacity.237  Pooling of insurance companies 
allows the pool to provide more coverage capacity than individual insurers 
                                                                                                                 
 231. See id. ("[I]t would be difficult for insurers to determine the amount of funds to 
contribute to such reserves each year because of the significant challenges associated with 
estimating the frequency [and severity] of potential terrorist attacks."). 
 232. See id. at 20 ("Insurers and other industry participants . . . said that reinsurance for 
terrorism risk, which largely was unavailable after September 11, continues to be expensive 
and available in limited amounts."); Marré, supra note 32, at 154 (noting that the private 
reinsurance market has failed to adequately respond to the terrorism risk). 
 233. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 25 ("[O]verall 
terrorism insurance capacity might not increase because insurers might use the reserves as a 
substitute for reinsurance . . . ."). 
 234. See id. at 26 ("Insurers . . . might use the reserves to shield a portion of their 
existing capital (or retained earnings) from the corporate income tax or inappropriately use 
tax-deductible reserves to manage their financial statements by increasing the reserves 
during good economic times and decreasing them in bad times."); see also Kunreuther & 
Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that it would be difficult to ensure that insurers 
were using the tax-deferred reserves as intended). 
 235. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 26 (noting that 
allowing insurers to increase their tax-deductible reserves would limit federal tax revenue). 
 236. See Pool Reinsurance Company Limited, Welcome to Pool Reinsurance, 
http://www.poolre.co.uk (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) ("The Pool Re scheme has been set up 
by the insurance industry in co-operation with the UK government so that insurers can 
continue to cover losses resulting from damage caused by acts of terrorism to commercial 
property in Great Britain.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 237. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 26 ("Another 
proposal involves establishing a group of insurance companies to pool their assets . . . ."); 
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 32 ("Another alternative would be to allow 
insurers to form an insurance pool to deal with specific lines of coverage . . . ."). 
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could provide independently.238  Insurance pools are usually used to 
accommodate large risks,239 and have been successful in the United 
States.240  Terrorism risk, however, is not well suited for risk pooling.241  
The GAO cautions that terrorism insurance pools would be plagued with 
the same problems as proposals allowing insurers to increase their tax-
deductible reserves.242  These include problems calculating the necessary 
size of the pool,243 the fact that capacity might not necessarily increase,244 
and decreased tax revenues.245  Additionally, it is uncertain whether pooling 
would be adequate to cover large-scale losses.246 
Neither tax code revisions nor the creation of terrorism insurance pools 
is an attractive alternative to TRIA.247  Both proposals will "increase the 
federal government’s exposure to terrorism-related losses."248  Thus, a third 
alternative must be considered. 
                                                                                                                 
 238. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 26 (noting that 
pooling allows insurers "to provide a greater amount of terrorism insurance coverage than 
could be provided by individual companies acting independently"). 
 239. See id. ("Insurance pools typically are formed to cover large risks . . . ."). 
 240. See Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, About the FHCF, 
http://www.sbafla.com/fhcf/AbouttheFHCF/tabid/278/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 
2011) ("The purpose of the [Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund] is to protect and advance 
the state’s interest in maintaining insurance capacity in Florida by providing reimbursement 
to insurers for a portion of their catastrophic hurricane losses.") (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 241. See Véronique Bruggeman, Capital Market Instruments for Catastrophe Risk 
Financing, AMERICAN RISK AND INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, 32 (2007), 
http://www.empiwifo.uni-freiburg.de/lehre-teaching-1/summer-term-09/materials-seminar-
in-risk-management/bruggeman.pdf ("Terrorism risk does not lend itself well to the pooling 
mechanism of insurance, since the law of large numbers cannot be used . . . ."). 
 242. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 28–29 (noting 
that terrorism reinsurance pools would create problems similar to proposals calling for 
alteration of the tax code to allow insurers to build surplus). 
 243. See id. at 28 ("[A]s is the case with tax-deductible reserves, it may be difficult 
to . . . determin[e] the appropriate size of the pool . . . ."). 
 244. See id. ("[A] reinsurance pool might not create new industry capacity or bring in 
additional capital to support more business."). 
 245. See id. at 28–29 (noting that reinsurance pools could reduce tax revenues "if 
premiums paid to the pool were tax deductible" or "if the pool [were] a tax-exempt entity"). 
 246. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 32 ("[I]t is unclear whether 
[insurance pools] would provide adequate coverage against mega-terrorism."). 
 247. See supra Part V.A (noting the weaknesses of proposals to loosen the tax code to 
facilitate the creation of tax-deductible reserves for terrorism losses); see also supra Part 
V.B (noting the weaknesses of proposals to create terrorism insurance pools). 
 248. TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 22. 
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VI.  Federal Terror CATs 
Rather than continue to reinsure primary terrorism insurers with tax 
dollars, the federal government should provide terrorism reinsurance by 
securitizing the risk.  Securitization of the federal government’s reinsurance 
risk can be achieved by creating a market for terrorism catastrophe bonds, 
or Terror CATs.  
The basic structure for securitizing risk through catastrophe bonds is 
simple.  First, an insurer creates a special purpose reinsurance vehicle 
(SPRV) to handle transactions with the capital markets.249  The SPRV is a 
captive entity distinct from the insurer.  The insurer uses the SPRV to 
facilitate the bond transactions and manage premiums collected from 
insureds.  The insurer must determine what amount of risk it wishes to 
securitize, and SPRV will raise capital from investors to cover that amount 
through bond sales.250  The SPRV invests the bond proceeds in stable 
collateral investments that are uncorrelated with terrorism risk.251  The 
SPRV is further funded from premiums collected from insureds.252  The 
interest payments paid to investors in the SPRV are derived from the 
proceeds of the collateral investments and premiums collected from the 
insurer.253  Catastrophe bonds may have an indemnity trigger that is 
prompted by the occurrence of an insured loss, an index trigger that 
activates following an aggregate industry loss, or a parametric trigger that is 
based on the occurrence of a specified event and an additional physical 
contingency.254  If the catastrophe bonds are triggered, then the reinsurance 
available from the SPRV attaches and the principal collected from the bond 
                                                                                                                 
 249. See A.M. Best, Quick Reference:  Rating Natural Catastrophe Bonds 1 (2008) 
[hereinafter CAT Bonds], http://www.ambest.com/ratings/methodology/QuickRef-
CatBonds.pdf ("Securitization of insurance risk is achieved through the use of a Special 
Purpose Reinsurance Vehicle (SPRV)."). 
 250. See id. ("The SPRV raises funds from investors . . . ."). 
 251. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 26 (noting that bond proceeds are invested in 
"safe, short-term securities such as government bonds or AAA corporates"); id. ("[F]unds 
from investors [are] deposited into a collateral [investment] account and invested in high-
quality securities."). 
 252. See CAT Bonds, supra note 249, at 1 ("The insurance or reinsurance company 
seeking catastrophic risk cover[age] pays premiums to the SPRV, which is effectively a 
third-party reinsurer."). 
 253. See id. ("The coupon/interest payment to the investors is derived from (1) the 
premium paid to the SPRV for the reinsurance coverage and (2) investment income earned 
on the deposit in the collateral account."). 
 254. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 11 (noting the different triggers available for 
catastrophe bonds). 
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sales is available to reinsure the primary insurer’s losses.255  Thus, in the 
event of a covered loss, the investors lose some or all of their principal.256  
In exchange for this risk of loss, investors are paid a high interest rate.257 
A.  Risk Securitization and Traditional Reinsurance 
Risk securitization has a number of advantages over traditional 
reinsurance, but it also has a number of disadvantages.258  The balance of 
these advantages and disadvantages suggests that risk securitization may be 
better suited for low-frequency and high-severity events than traditional 
reinsurance.259 
1.  Advantages of Risk Securitization 
Risk securitization has a number of advantages when compared to 
traditional reinsurance.260  Because of this, the CAT bond market has grown 
considerably and rivals the traditional commercial property/casualty 
reinsurance market.261 
One advantage of risk-linked securities is that they are beneficial to 
insurers in hard reinsurance markets.262  Because risk securitization is only 
                                                                                                                 
 255. See CAT Bonds, supra note 249, at 1 (noting that the funds raised from the bond 
sales are available to pay for losses arising from a triggering event). 
 256. See id. (noting that following attachment, investors’ principal is available to cover 
the insured loss). 
 257. See Silke Finken & Christian Laux, Catastrophe Bonds and Reinsurance:  The 
Competitive Effect of Information-Insensitive Triggers, 76 J. RISK & INS. 579, 581 (2009) 
("In exchange for bearing this risk, investors receive a higher promised interest on their CAT 
bonds . . . ."). 
 258. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 10–11 (noting the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of insurance-linked securities compared to traditional reinsurance). 
 259. See id. at 15 (noting the benefits of risk securitization for high-severity and low-
probability risks); Cummins, supra note 214, at 32 (supporting the use of CAT Bonds to 
fund "mega-catastrophes"). 
 260. See Sylvie Bouriaux & William L. Scott, Capital Market Solutions to Terrorism 
Risk Coverage:  A Feasibility Study, 5 J. RISK FIN. 34, 37 (2004) ("The benefits of insurance-
linked securities and derivatives as alternatives . . . to traditional reinsurance have been well 
documented."). 
 261. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 24 (noting that the "CAT bond market has 
expanded significantly in recent years" and "it is of significant size in comparison with the 
property-catastrophe reinsurance market"). 
 262. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 9 (noting the benefit of using risk securitization 
as an alternative to reinsurance in hard insurance markets). 
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an attractive alternative when traditional reinsurance options are more 
expensive,263 risk-linked securities have a moderating effect on the 
traditional reinsurance market.264 
A second advantage of risk-linked securities is that they have the 
potential to solve capacity problems in insurance markets.265  Because of 
the enormity of capital markets266 and the potential for pure risk transfer,267 
risk-linked securities can solve capacity gaps.268  Traditional reinsurance 
requires a tremendous amount of surplus to cover terrorism losses.269  This 
is the idea behind insurance pools.  Pools provide insurers with the 
opportunity to share surplus with other insurers and to take advantage of the 
law of numbers.270  Terrorism risk, however, is not well suited for 
pooling.271  Risk transfer allows insurers to shift terrorism risk to the capital 
markets,272 which is ideal.273  The capacity potential of capital markets and 
insurers’ ability to transfer risk creates greater coverage capacity than 
traditional risk pooling could provide.274 
Although risk is inherent in risk-linked securities, the data demonstrate 
that risk-linked securities may be attractive investments.  Risk-linked 
securities often perform better than traditional stocks and bonds.275  This 
                                                                                                                 
 263. See id. at 10 ("Insurance-linked securities are . . . only justifiable . . . when other 
loss-financing alternatives are more expensive."). 
 264. See id. at 14 (noting that risk-linked securities moderate reinsurance prices). 
 265. See Bouriaux & Scott, supra note 260, at 37 (noting how risk-linked securities can 
increase market capacity). 
 266. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 32 (noting the ability of capital markets to absorb 
a $100 billion loss). 
 267. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 30 (noting the potential for "pure risk transfers" 
from insurers to the capital markets). 
 268. See Bouriaux & Scott, supra note 260, at 36 (noting that risk transfer to the capital 
markets can increase coverage capacity by taking pressure off insurers to maintain 
tremendous capital surpluses). 
 269. See id. at 35 (noting that the nature of terrorism risk requires insurance companies 
to "maintain a significant amount of surplus"). 
 270. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 26 (noting how 
insurance pools provide greater capacity than individual insurers could provide in the 
aggregate due to the law of numbers and shared surplus). 
 271. See Bouriaux & Scott, supra note 260, at 35 ("Unlike many conventional risks . . . 
terrorism risk does not lend itself well to [risk] pooling . . . ."). 
 272. See id. at 36 (noting how risk transfer shifts the risk of loss from insurers to capital 
markets). 
 273. See id. ("The need for extensive capital suggests the need for risk transfer . . . ."). 
 274. See id. at 37 (noting that by transferring risks to the capital markets, insurers 
require less surplus and can provide greater coverage capacity). 
 275. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 14 ("[I]nvestments in catastrophe risk indeed 
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performance is attributed to the fact that risk-linked securities have little 
correlation with systemic risks that traditional securities face,276 have little 
or no credit risk,277 and pay high returns when not triggered.278  In addition, 
investors can limit their risk exposure by diversifying their investment 
portfolio with other securities.279  Thus, risk-linked securities can benefit 
both investors and insurers by providing investors with potential investment 
returns280 and decreasing insurers’ loss exposure.281 
CAT bonds in particular enjoy a number of advantages among risk-
linked securities. Indeed, CATs have become market participants’ favorite 
risk-linked security.282  One reason for this success is that CAT bonds have 
become increasingly standardized.283  This increasing standardization, 
coupled with the simplicity of the overall CAT bond structure, increases 
liquidity and marketability.284  Another advantage of CAT bonds is that 
they provide multi-year protection.285  Traditional reinsurance operates in 
                                                                                                                 
are proven to over-perform domestic bonds and returns on catastrophe bonds are proven to 
be less volatile than either stocks or bonds."); Cummins, supra note 214, at 41 (noting that 
even after Hurricane Katrina, "yields on CAT bonds were 2 to 3 percent higher than yields 
on BB [rated] corporate[]" bonds). 
 276. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 27 ("[CAT] bonds are attractive to investors 
because catastrophic events have low correlations with returns from securities markets 
and . . . are valuable for diversification purposes."). 
 277. See id. (noting that investors are insulated from credit risk because their risk-
linked securities are fully collateralized by the collateral held in the SPRV’s investment 
account). 
 278. See id. at 26 (noting that investors are paid a risk premium to compensate them for 
the risk of lost principal). 
 279. See Bouriaux & Scott, supra note 260, at 36 ("Investors may further diversify the 
overall risk in their portfolio . . . by combining insurance risk with financial risk."). 
 280. See id. at 37 ("[S]tudies have shown that capital market participants, by allocating 
a small percentage of their assets in catastrophe bonds, create a more efficient portfolio.").  
Thus, "[t]he inclusion of insurance-linked securities . . . may increase the risk/reward profile 
of an investment portfolio."  Id. 
 281. See id. at 36 (noting how risk transfer shifts the risk of loss from insurers to capital 
markets). 
 282. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 25 ("The securitized structure that has achieved 
the greatest degree of success is the CAT bond."). 
 283. See id. at 26 ("CAT bonds have become more standardized."). 
 284. See Shadow Regulatory Committees of Asia, Australia-New Zealand, Europe, 
Japan, Latin America, and the United States, Making Securitization Work for Financial 
Stability and Economic Growth 4 (2009), http://www.aei.org/docLib/081709%20 
Joint%20Statement%20-%20Chile.pdf (noting that greater standardization and simplicity in 
investment instruments increases liquidity). 
 285. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 26 (noting that insurers favor CAT bonds 
because they offer multi-year protection). 
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one-year cycles,286 while CATs can be set to mature after a number of 
years.287  Multi-year protection insulates insurers against cyclical price 
changes inherent in catastrophe risk and reduces transaction costs.288  
Because of this, insurers prefer CATs with three- or five-year maturity 
dates so insurers can respond to new information, protect against 
reinsurance price changes, and reduce costs.289 
Among CAT bonds, insurers and investors prefer CATs with index 
triggers because of the advantages they offer.290  Index triggered securities 
are attractive because they minimize moral hazard and adverse selection, 
reduce transaction costs, and increase liquidity.291  Insurers favor index 
triggers because they allow quicker access to capital following a 
catastrophic event.292 
Because of these advantages, risk-linked securities, and CATs in 
particular, are attractive for managing catastrophic risk.293  Risk-linked 
securities, however, are not without their own disadvantages. 
2.  Disadvantages of Risk Securitization 
A number of disadvantages of risk securitization have prevented risk-
linked securities from becoming more prominent.  These disadvantages 
include high costs, liquidity problems, and basis risk. 
High costs have prevented risk-linked securities from becoming more 
prominent.  For CATs, these costs include the high premium that insurers 
                                                                                                                 
 286. See id. (noting that traditional reinsurance typically operates on a one-year cycle). 
 287. See id. (noting that CATs can be offered in multi-year terms). 
 288. See id. at 33 ("Maturities greater than 1 year [are] favored because they provide a 
steady source of risk capital that is insulated from year-to-year swings in reinsurance prices 
and because they permit issuers to amortize costs of issuance over a longer period, 
reducing . . . transaction costs."). 
 289. See id. at 33–34 (noting that insurers prefer terms of three to five years to protect 
against rising reinsurance prices, but also so insurers can respond to new information). 
 290. See id. at 33 (noting that CATs with index and hybrid triggers (combining index 
triggers with other triggers) account for 80% of the CAT market). 
 291. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 26 (noting that index triggers lower moral 
hazard, adverse selection, and transaction costs while increasing liquidity). 
 292. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 26 ("Indices also have the advantage of being 
measureable more quickly after the event than indemnity triggers so that the sponsor 
receives payment under the bond more quickly."). 
 293. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 15 (noting the benefits of using CAT bonds to 
manage high-severity/low-probability risks); Cummins, supra note 214, at 32 ("CAT bonds 
make sound economic sense as a mechanism for funding mega-catastrophes."). 
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must pay to investors and high transaction costs.294  First, high interest costs 
have undermined the market for CATs.  Because CATs are weakly 
correlated with systematic market risks, CATs should sell with just the risk 
premium.295  In practice, however, the CAT bond "premium puzzle" has 
artificially inflated the premium that insurers must pay to investors.296  This 
has raised the price of issuing CATs above what would be attainable in a 
perfect financial market.297  Recently, as CATs have become more 
standardized and market participants have become more familiar with 
CATs, the spread between theoretical and actual premiums has narrowed.298 
Transaction costs, arising from underwriting costs and regulatory 
compliance costs, have also increased the costs of risk-linked securities 
issues.299  As CATs have become standardized and underwriters have 
become familiar with CAT offerings, underwriting costs for CATs have 
declined.300  Compliance with the U.S. securities regime, however, is costly, 
and issuers have been issuing risk-linked securities offshore to reduce their 
regulatory compliance costs.301  Operating offshore undermines 
marketability and liquidity of risk-linked securities, and the market for risk-
linked securities would benefit from a relaxation in securities regulations, 
                                                                                                                 
 294. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 14 (listing interest costs and transaction costs 
as reasons for the high costs of risk-linked securities). 
 295. See id. at 30 ("[CATs] are only weakly correlated with market risk, implying that 
in perfect financial markets [CATs] could be traded at a price including just small risk 
premiums."). 
 296. See id. at 30 n.77 and accompanying text (suggesting that the CAT "premium 
puzzle" keeps premiums inflated because of the uncertainty of loss associated with CATs, 
market unfamiliarity with risk-linked securities, and liquidity concerns (citing J. David 
Cummins, David Lalonde & Richard D. Phillips, The Basis Risk of Catastrophic-Loss Index 
Securities, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 77, 111 (2004))). 
 297. See id. at 30 (noting that high risk premiums increase the cost of CATs). 
 298. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 38 ("[T]he earlier critique of CAT bonds, i.e., 
excessive spreads, no longer applies.  This is the expected result in a market where there is 
growing investor interest and expertise as well as growing volume, which adds to market 
liquidity."). 
 299. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 14 (noting that in the context of risk-linked 
securities, transaction costs include underwriting fees and the costs of regulatory 
compliance). 
 300. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 40 ("[I]nvestment banks have succeeded in 
reducing transaction costs . . . as they have gained experience with insurance-linked 
securitizations . . . ."). 
 301. See id. at 42 ("Transactions costs for the onshore [risk-linked securities] that have 
been issued . . . have been higher than for offshore issues."). 
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which would facilitate onshore issues.302  Thus, transaction costs can be 
lowered further.303 
Liquidity concerns also present an obstacle to greater proliferation of 
risk-linked securities.304  A number of factors contribute to this problem.  
First, the unpredictable nature of risk-linked securities makes them difficult 
to price.305  Second, to reduce transaction costs, insurers are only able to 
privately place risk-linked securities.306  As a consequence, these securities 
never reach the public capital markets and, therefore, have a restricted 
number of potential investors.307  Finally, reputational concerns about 
betting against catastrophes have reduced the marketability of risk-linked 
securities.308  Although liquidity is a concern, the market for risk-linked 
securities continues to grow.309 
Basis risk inherent in index triggered risk-linked securities has also 
retarded the growth of the risk-linked securities market.310  Basis risk is the 
risk that a covered event, which causes insured losses, will not trigger 
reinsurance coverage.311  For example, TRIA uses an index trigger.312  
Under TRIA, federal reinsurance is unavailable until aggregate industry 
                                                                                                                 
 302. See id. (noting that onshore issuance of risk-linked securities would facilitate 
market growth). 
 303. See id. (noting that jurisdictions with favorable regulatory regimes provide lower 
issuance costs). 
 304. See Bouriaux & Scott, supra note 260, at 38 ("Another element that has 
contributed to the slow growth of insurance securitization is the lack of liquidity . . . ."). 
 305. See id. (noting that the difficultly investors have pricing risk-linked securities 
undermines liquidity). 
 306. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 43 (noting that risk-linked securities can only be 
marketed to institutional and accredited investors under Regulation D); Bouriaux & Scott, 
supra note 260, at 38 (noting that the market for risk-linked securities is mostly limited to 
institutional investors). 
 307. See Bouriaux & Scott, supra note 260, at 38 ("Secondary market trading volume in 
[risk-linked securities] is very low."). 
 308. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 33 ("[R]eputational concerns associated 
with . . . [securities] linked to potentially tragic human events deter institutional investors."). 
 309. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 36 ("[R]ecent data suggest that there is broad 
market interest in CAT bonds among institutional investors."). 
 310. See id. at 42 (noting that basis risk is the largest impediment to growth of the risk-
linked securities market). 
 311. See A.M. Best, Gauging the Basis Risk of Catastrophe Bonds 1 (2006), 
http://www.ambest.com/ratings/methodology/catbonds-methodology.pdf ("Basis risk . . . 
generally reflects the possibility that a [risk-linked security] may not be partially or fully 
triggered (for covered perils) even when the sponsor of the [risk-linked security] has 
suffered a loss."). 
 312. See TRIPRA § 103(e)(1)(B) (establishing an index trigger for TRIA). 
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losses exceed $100 million.313  Thus, if one insurer suffered a $99,999,999 
loss, and no other insurers suffered any losses, no TRIA assistance would 
be available.  The risk that an insurer might suffer an insured loss, but 
coverage might not be available, is basis risk.314  The problem inherent in 
basis risk is not that it exists, but that basis risk is difficult to calculate.315  If 
basis risk could be precisely calculated, then insurers could account for it.316  
But basis risk is difficult to calculate because of the uncertainty inherent in 
catastrophic events.317  This uncertainty causes problems for insurers and 
makes index triggered securities less attractive.318  Yet index triggered 
securities are still the most favored among market participants.319 
B.  Federal Terror CATs 
Given the advantages securitization offers for managing catastrophic 
risk, the federal government should help the insurance industry securitize 
terrorism risk.  This could be done through the use of terrorism catastrophe 
bonds, or Terror CATs.  
The federal government must continue to require insurers to offer 
terrorism insurance on terms similar to regular property and casualty 
coverage.  The government should provide reinsurance capacity by issuing 
terror CATs to the capital markets.  Thus, the federal government should 
act as an SPRV. 
                                                                                                                 
 313. See id. ("[N]o compensation shall be paid by the Secretary . . . unless the aggregate 
industry insured losses resulting from such certified act of terrorism exceed . . . 
$100,000,000."). 
 314. See supra notes 311–13 and accompanying text (outlining the nature of basis risk 
in the context of risk-linked securities). 
 315. See Bouriaux & Scott, supra note 260, at 38 ("The issue per se is not the existence 
of basis risk, but its assessment and quantification."). 
 316. See id. ("Once thoroughly quantified, if possible, basis risk in a financial 
transaction can be minimized and almost eliminated via ‘over-hedging’ or ‘under-
hedging.’"). 
 317. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 33 (noting that terrorism risk may exacerbate 
the basis risk problem). 
 318. See id. (noting the problem basis risk poses for insurers). 
 319. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 33 (noting that CATs with index and hybrid 
triggers (combining index triggers with other triggers) account for 80% of the CAT market). 
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1.  $60 Billion Terrorism Reinsurance Fund 
The federal government should sell three tranches of $20 billion of 
Terror CATs to the capital markets.  The proceeds will be used to fund a 
$60 billion terrorism reinsurance fund.  The fund will offer 90% 
indemnification to participating insurers following a terrorist attack.320  
CAT proceeds will be invested in stable assets, and any income will be used 
to pay for the program’s administrative costs up to a certain limit.  Beyond 
that limit, income from the collateral account will be used to pay interest 
costs on the bonds or accumulate to the fund. 
The three tranches should be sold on successive years.  Until the fund 
is fully capitalized, the federal government should cover the gap between 
bond proceeds and full capitalization.321  Thus, during the first program 
year, the federal government should sell $20 billion worth of bonds and 
cover the remaining $40 billion.  During the second year, the fund would 
have $40 billion in bond proceeds, and the federal government would cover 
the remaining $20 billion.  During the third program year, the fund should 
be fully capitalized. 
The bonds should have three-year terms.322  Thus, the fourth program 
year will require a fourth bond offering to cover the funds lost when the 
first tranche matures.  Each tranche would be junior in priority to the prior 
tranche.  Thus, following an insured loss, junior tranches will lose more 
principal than senior tranches. 
2.  Funding Each Terror CAT Tranche 
Because CATs entail the risk of lost principal, investors will demand a 
risk premium.323  The government should be able to price the bonds so they 
will be attractive to the market.324  Before each program year, insurers 
                                                                                                                 
 320. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  NBCR COVERAGE, supra note 53, at 29 (noting that 
greater reinsurance coverage allows primary insurers to provide greater capacity); see also 
OECD, supra note 145 (noting that economic incentives encourage risk mitigation). 
 321. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 15 (noting that 
insurers lack capacity to manage terrorism risk on their own).  
 322. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 33 (noting the advantages of CATs with three- to 
five-year terms). 
 323. See id. at 26 (noting that investors demand a risk premium to compensate them for 
the risk of lost principal). 
 324. See Brunet Marks, supra note 145, at 440 (stating that the federal government is 
more capable of gathering terrorism-related information, but states are best suited to regulate 
state insurers). 
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wishing to obtain federal reinsurance for terrorism risk will have to submit 
information on the amount of coverage they wish to obtain in millions.  The 
federal government should use this information to determine (1) the bond 
interest rate and (2) the price of the premiums it will charge insurers 
accordingly.  The premiums obtained from insurers will be used to fund the 
interest the bonds pay each year.  The premiums for each tranche will be 
fixed for the three-year terms, assuring that there will be adequate 
premiums to cover interest costs.  
Insurers will have to commit to funding each tranche for the three 
years.325  To obtain full coverage, insurers must pay premiums for all three 
tranches.  For the first program year, insurers pay three times the premium 
for the first tranche.  One-third of these premiums will be used to pay 
interest on the bonds.  The remainder will accrue to the fund and will be 
available for future losses.  Likewise, during the second program year, the 
insurers pay the premium for each tranche and a third premium to the fund.  
When the fund is fully capitalized, all of the premiums charged are used to 
pay interest costs on the bonds.  Insurers wishing to join the program and 
obtain full coverage will need to fund all three tranches.  If the premiums 
charged are not used to pay interest on the tranches to which new insurers 
have not committed, they will go into the fund. Insurers wishing to leave 
the program will stop funding successive tranches, but they will only obtain 
one-third or two-thirds of coverage, depending on the number of tranches 
they are funding. Additionally, insurers will only be able to obtain 
indemnification for the coverage amount each insurer submitted to the 
government.  Thus, coverage will be assignable before a triggering attack if 
one insurer needs more or another needs less coverage.326 
3.  Attributes of Terror CATs 
Each terror CAT will have a term of three years.  The bonds will have 
an index trigger based on an aggregate industry loss of $100 million.327  To 
be accessible to retail investors, the bonds should be in denominations no 
greater than $1,000.328  Each tranche will be junior to prior tranches.  
                                                                                                                 
 325. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 33 (noting that multi-year commitments reduce 
transaction costs) 
 326. See id. at 26 (noting that traditional insurance operates in one-year cycles, 
allowing insurers needs to change each year). 
 327. See id. at 28 (noting that index triggers are preferred by market participants). 
 328. See Bouriaux & Scott, supra note 260, at 38 (noting that greater access to retail 
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Losses will be paid from each tranche according to a fixed schedule.  First, 
investors in each tranche lose the next interest payment.  Interest payments 
will be made at the end of each term year, so the third and final interest 
payment will be made on the maturity date.  If the lost interest is not 
sufficient to cover the insured loss, the most junior tranche will lose 12% of 
its principal.  Next, the second tranche will lose 8% of its principal.  
Finally, the most senior tranche will lose 4% of its principal.  The tranches 
continue to lose principal according to this schedule until the insured losses 
are satisfied.  For an example of how this schedule would work, see Table 1 
infra. 
4.  Recapitalizing the Fund Following a Loss 
Following an insured loss, the fund will need to be immediately 
recapitalized.  This could be accomplished by the government depositing 
$20 billion into the fund and distributing $20 billion in terror CATs to 
institutional investors who are willing to pay for the bonds over three years 
with interest.  The Secretary of the Treasury could require more or less 
capitalization at his discretion.  If $5 billion is needed to fully recapitalize, 
then that would be most appropriate.  If more than $20 billion is needed to 
fully recapitalize, then it would be hard to convince institutional investors 
to fund a tranche larger than $20 billion.  At first, the government will have 
$20 billion at risk, but as the emergency tranche is paid, more investor 
money, and less government money, is at risk.  If another attack occurs, 
then the remaining balance owed to the government would be forgiven.  In 
addition, should a second attack occur, the emergency tranche will lose 
principal according to the same schedule as the tranche immediately senior 
to the emergency tranche.  The interest rate investors pay as the bonds are 
paid off will be lower than the coupon rate of the emergency tranche, which 
will also correspond to the coupon rate of the tranche immediately senior to 
the emergency tranche.  Although the return for investors will be less, the 
investors will have less risk.  A surcharge will be needed to pay the 
increased interest costs, but only the emergency tranche will receive interest 
for the year of the attack because interest on the other tranches will be 
forgiven following an attack.  The surcharge would be levied on all 
participating insurers.  When the tranche for the next program year is 
issued, it will be limited to the amount needed to fully capitalize the fund or 
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$20 billion, whichever is less.  Because insurers will now be funding 
interest costs on four tranches, insurance costs will increase for three years 
until the emergency tranche matures.  This is a sensible consequence 
because without federal reinsurance, insurance costs would increase 
following an attack as insurers recapitalize and offer less coverage.329  
Hopefully, recapitalization will never be necessary. 
5.  Other Program Provisions 
The terror CAT program should maintain a number of TRIA’s 
provisions.  The program should only cover commercial property and 
casualty insurance.330  Also, the program must continue to mandate that 
insurers provide terrorism coverage.331  This would apply regardless of 
whether insurers opt into the program.  Terrorism coverage must be 
provided on terms similar to non-terrorism coverage.332  Additionally, the 
program must continue to preempt state-approved terrorism exclusions.333 
The program should include a number of additional provisions.  First, 
to encourage investment in terror CATs, investors’ returns should not be 
taxed.  Second, to prohibit betting against terror CATs, short-selling of 
terror CATs must be prohibited.334  The SEC could presumably enforce this 
restriction internationally by relying on the protective principle of 
international law.335  Third, the government must have the ability to redeem 
the bonds at any time.  In addition, the program should leave traditional 
                                                                                                                 
 329. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  COVERAGE STATUS, supra note 29, at 11 (noting that 
insurance markets would harden following a terrorist attack). 
 330. See TRIPRA § 102(6)(B) (limiting TRIA’s applicability to commercial property 
and casualty insurers). 
 331. See id. § 103(c) (requiring insurers to offer terrorism coverage). 
 332. See id. (requiring that insurers offer terrorism insurance on terms similar to non-
terrorism coverage). 
 333. See id. § 105(a)–(b) ("Any terrorism exclusion in a contract for property and 
casualty insurance . . . shall be void to the extent that it excludes losses that would otherwise 
be insured losses. . . . Any state approval of any terrorism exclusion from a contract for 
property and casualty insurance . . . shall be void . . . ."). 
 334. See Paul E. Fischer, Optimal Contracting and Insider Trading Restrictions, 47 J. 
FIN. 673, 686 (1992) (noting that prohibitions on short-selling help eliminate investors’ 
divergent objectives). 
 335. See United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("The 
protective principle provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to 
‘certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the 
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.’" (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(3) (1987))). 
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NBCR exclusions in place, but should provide that NBCR exclusions are 
inoperative following a certified terrorist attack.336  Finally, participation in 
the program should be optional.337  If costs are too high for insurers they 
can opt out, but they must continue to offer terrorism coverage to their 
insureds.  The program is intended as a sustainable alternative to TRIA, but 
if private reinsurance can respond the program will eventually become 
unnecessary.  If insurers are not satisfied, they have a powerful incentive to 
develop their own alternatives. 
C.  The Case for Federal Terror CATs 
As demonstrated earlier, securitization is well suited for managing 
catastrophic risk.338  A federal terror CAT program would provide a number 
of advantages over other alternatives, but such a program raises concerns. 
1.  Advantages of a Federal Terror CAT Program 
One advantage of a federal terror CAT program is that it would limit 
taxpayers’ exposure to terrorism risk.339  The federal government has 
money at risk only when the program needs capital.340  When the program 
is fully funded, the capital markets shoulder the entire risk.341  Under TRIA, 
the federal government faces tremendous potential exposure.342  The 
                                                                                                                 
 336. See TERRORISM INSURANCE:  NBCR COVERAGE, supra note 53, at 10 (noting that 
Congress wishes for NBCR-related terrorism losses to be covered under TRIA); see also 
Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc., Position on a Long-Term Solution to 
Terrorism Exposure, 54 RISK MGMT. 50, 50 (2007) (noting that a long-term solution to 
terrorism risk must cover NBCR terrorism losses). 
 337. See TRIPRA § 101(6) (noting that Congress desires a private market for terrorism 
insurance when such a market can be self-sustainable). 
 338. See supra Part VI.A (noting the advantages of risk securitization for dealing with 
catastrophic risk). 
 339. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 28 tbl.4 (noting taxpayers’ 
potential exposure under TRIA). 
 340. See supra Part VI.B (providing federal government exposure only at the beginning 
of the program and following an attack). 
 341. See Snow, supra note 51 ("TRIA represents a form of publicly-provided and 
subsidized terrorism risk reinsurance, which essentially transfers risks associated with 
terrorism losses from the private to the public sector (taxpayers)."); supra Part VI.B (noting 
that the federal government will not face loss exposure when the fund is fully capitalized). 
 342. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 28 tbl.4 (noting taxpayers’ 
potential exposure under TRIA). 
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exposure the government would face under the terror CAT program would 
be significant, but the risk is limited in time and is moderated as the fund is 
capitalized.343  TRIA creates a continuous and substantial risk of loss for the 
federal government.344  The proposed federal terror CAT program limits the 
federal government’s exposure in time and extent.345 
Second, the terror CAT program allows the party in the best position 
to evaluate terrorism potential to price coverage.346  Currently, terrorism 
information sharing is asymmetrical and insurers cannot accurately price 
coverage.347  However, the federal government would price reinsurance 
coverage under the proposed federal terror CAT program.348  By allowing 
the federal government to use its superior insight on terrorism, it should be 
able to determine appropriate CAT prices and corresponding reinsurance 
premiums.  The premiums charged to insurers will enable them to price 
their primary insurance according to their reinsurance costs.349  Thus, under 
a federal terror CAT program, some of the guess work of setting terrorism 
insurance prices would be reduced.350 
Third, terror CATs may help encourage risk mitigation.351  In limiting 
terrorism risk, it is important to encourage risk mitigation.352  Adverse 
selection is a problem under TRIA because only those considering 
themselves at risk will purchase terrorism insurance.353  Adverse selection 
                                                                                                                 
 343. See supra Part VI.B (providing the federal government with maximum risk 
exposure of $40 billion that diminishes as the fund is capitalized). 
 344. See TRIPRA § 103(e)(1)(A) (providing that following a triggering event, the 
federal government provides 85% reinsurance above each insurer’s deductible). 
 345. See supra note 343 and accompanying text (noting that the proposed program 
limits the federal government’s exposure to terrorism losses). 
 346. See supra Part III.C (noting that the federal government is in the best position to 
assess terrorism risk). 
 347. See supra Part III.C (noting that TRIA creates an information asymmetry between 
the federal government and market participants). 
 348. See supra Part VI.B (providing that the federal government sets terror CAT 
prices). 
 349. See supra Part VI.B (providing insurers the ability to pass their reinsurance costs 
along to their insureds). 
 350. See Manns, supra note 70, at 2516 (discussing the uncertainties related to 
terrorism insurance). 
 351. See ALCIRA KREIMER ET AL., MANAGING DISASTER IN MEXICO:  MARKET 
INCENTIVES FOR MITIGATION 38 (1999) (suggesting that market incentives provide incentives 
to mitigate risk). 
 352. See Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 5, at 35 (noting the importance of 
encouraging the private sector to mitigate terrorism risk). 
 353. See Manns, supra note 70, at 2537–38 (noting that adverse selection is inevitable 
in terrorism insurance). 
1870 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1825 (2011) 
will also be a concern under a terror CAT program, but terror CATs may 
encourage insureds and others to limit their risk exposure.354  Because terror 
CATs are most valuable when a triggering event does not occur, investors 
have an interest in ensuring that attacks do not occur and in ordering their 
affairs so losses are minimal.355  A prohibition on short-selling terror CATs 
is essential to maintaining this incentive.356  In addition, the proposed 
program provides insurers with only 90% indemnification, creating an 
incentive for insurers to compel insureds to mitigate risks.357 
Fourth, a centralized federal terror CAT program allows insurers to 
enjoy the advantages of risk-linked securitization while lowering the cost of 
access to the capital markets. The costs of issuing risk-linked securities 
have limited their popularity among insurers.358  Chief among these are 
costs of complying with securities regulations.359  The Securities Act of 
1933 (Securities Act) restricts issuers’ ability to market and sell securities 
to investors.360  If each insurer were to issue its own terror CATs, the 
aggregate cost of regulatory compliance would be great and would limit 
coverage capacity.  Securities issued by the United States, however, are 
exempt from the Securities Act.361  Thus, the federal government need not 
comply with its own costly regulations when accessing capital markets.  
Because of this, insurers can obtain the advantages of risk-linked 
securitization without the expense of complying with the securities regime. 
High underwriting costs have impeded the development of risk-linked 
securitization as well.362  Because underwriters must also comply with the 
Securities Act, underwriters must proceed carefully before bringing 
                                                                                                                 
 354. See id. (noting the inevitability of adverse selection in terrorism insurance). 
 355. See KREIMER ET AL., supra note 351, at 38–39 (noting that market incentives can 
help motivate risk mitigation). 
 356. See Fischer, supra note 334, at 686 (noting that prohibitions on short-selling help 
eliminate investors’ divergent objectives). 
 357. See OECD, supra note 145, at 6 (noting the importance of economic incentives to 
encourage risk mitigation). 
 358. See supra Part VI.A (noting that the cost of risk securitization has undermined its 
popularity). 
 359. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 14 (noting that costs of compliance with the 
securities regime contribute to the high costs of risk securitization). 
 360. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2006) (regulating the primary 
securities market). 
 361. See id. § 3(a)(2) (providing that securities "issued or guaranteed by the United 
States" are exempt from the Securities Act of 1933). 
 362. See supra Part VI.A (noting how underwriting costs contribute to the high cost of 
risk securitization). 
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securities to the market.363  This is costly for underwriters.364  Because 
underwriters hired by the federal government to sell federal securities are 
also exempt from the Securities Act, underwriting costs should be 
minimal.365  In addition, increased standardization and greater market 
familiarity reduce the costs of underwriting CATs.366 
Fifth, terror CATs could reach a broader market than risk-linked 
securities issued by individual insurers.  Because of the Securities Act’s 
onerous restrictions, risk-linked securities are not traded on the retail 
market.367  Because terror CATs would be exempt from the Securities Act, 
insurers can gain access to the retail market.368  Thus, terror CATs could be 
traded on the public market, subject to short-selling restrictions.369  A 
broader market can spread risk further and provide greater capacity and 
increased liquidity.370 
Finally, the terror CAT program would provide the potential for a 
private market to develop.  Because the federal terror CAT program would 
be optional, and insurers can obtain a fraction of the coverage they require, 
the program leaves room for private reinsurance to respond.371  While 
private reinsurers alone do not have the capacity to handle terrorism risk, a 
program that alleviates some, but not all, of the burden provides reinsurers 
with the potential to respond.372 
                                                                                                                 
 363. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(11) (2006) (bringing underwriters within the 
purview of the Securities Act of 1933). 
 364. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 42 (noting that compliance with the Securities 
Act is costly). 
 365. See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(2) (2006) (exempting securities issued and 
guaranteed by the United States). 
 366. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 38 (noting that greater standardization and 
expertise lowers underwriting costs). 
 367. See id. (noting that CATs are limited to the nonpublic secondary market). 
 368. See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(2) (2006) (providing that securities "issued or 
guaranteed by the United States" are exempt from the Securities Act). 
 369. See supra Part VI.B (providing restrictions on the short-selling of terror CATs). 
 370. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 42 (noting that allowing greater market 
participation in risk-linked securities would facilitate market growth). 
 371. See supra Part VI.B (providing that participation in a federal terror CAT program 
would be optional). 
 372. See supra Part III.F (noting private reinsurers’ failure to respond to terrorism risk). 
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2.  Concerns 
There are a number of concerns associated with a federal terror CAT 
program.  First, like all catastrophe bonds with index triggers, basis risk is a 
concern that a federal terror CAT program would not solve.373  The basis 
risk under the proposed terror CAT program is equivalent to the basis risk 
under TRIA.374  Under TRIA, insurers have found ways to manage the basis 
risk inherent in a $100 million industry trigger.375  Thus, basis risk does not 
seem to be an insurmountable obstacle. 
Second, the cost effectiveness of such a program has not been 
analyzed. Although the federal government is in the best position to assess 
terrorism risk, it is uncertain whether terror CATs could be priced so that 
they are attractive to capital market participants.376  The federal government 
must assess its own ability to quantify terrorism risk as well as the cost-
effectiveness of issuing terror CATs. 
Finally, should another terrorist attack trigger federal terror CAT 
reinsurance, it is not certain how the capital market would respond to terror 
CATs in the aftermath.377  This uncertainty could impede the ability of a 
federal terror CAT program to continue beyond a single attack.378  Data 
indicate that capital markets are becoming more familiar with risk-linked 
securities,379 however, which reduces the risk that investors will abandon 
the federal terror CAT program following an attack.380  
                                                                                                                 
 373. See supra Part VI.A (noting that basis risk is inherent in index triggered risk-
linked securities). 
 374. See TRIPRA § 103(e)(B)(ii) (setting TRIA’s index trigger at $100 million); id. 
(setting the terror CAT program’s index trigger at $100 million). 
 375. See Nutter, supra note 197 (noting that insurers have sought reinsurance to cover 
basis risk under TRIA). 
 376. See Bruggeman, supra note 241, at 33 (noting the difficulty of pricing terrorism 
catastrophe bonds). 
 377. See Robert E. Litan, Catastrophe Insurance and Mitigating Disaster Losses:  A 
Possible Happy Marriage?, in MANAGING DISASTER RISK IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 187, 189 
(Alcira Kreimer & Margaret Arnold eds. 2000) (noting that it is uncertain how investors will 
respond following a triggering event that precipitates a loss in their investment). 
 378. See id. (suggesting that a triggering event that precipitates an investors’ loss could 
cause a decline in the CAT bond market). 
 379. See Cummins, supra note 214, at 38 (noting the growing interest and expertise in 
CAT bonds). 
 380. See id. at 41 (noting that the CAT bond market continues to do well following 
Hurricane Katrina despite investor losses). 
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VII.  Conclusion 
Although TRIA has successfully stabilized the insurance industry post-
9/11, the private market for terrorism insurance Congress hoped to foster 
has not developed.  TRIA helped prevent the development of a private 
market for terrorism insurance.  Currently, the insurance industry cannot 
handle terrorism risk on its own.  Continually renewing TRIA, however, is 
not an attractive alternative.  Although alternatives like the development of 
insurance pools and alteration of the tax code are not practical, risk 
securitization may be a viable alternative to manage the high-severity/low-
probability nature of terrorism.  To facilitate efficient risk securitization, the 
federal government should consider developing a program to issue 
terrorism catastrophe bonds to the capital market. 




Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3
Attack on 4/20/2012 Matures 1/1/13 Matures 1/1/14 Matures 1/1/15
Dollars in Billions
Principal: 20 20 20
-4% -8% -12% Total: -4.8
19.2 18.4 17.6
Total Loss Total Interest Cost Y12 -4% -8% -12% Total: -4.352
$26 billion $6 billion 18.432 16.928 15.488
-4% -8% -12% Total: -3.95
Total Lost Principal 17.695 15.574 13.629
$26bn - $6bn = $20bn -4% -8% -12% Total: -3.59
16.987 14.326 11.994
-4% -8% -12% Total: -3.265
16.308 13.18 10.555
0 0 -0.004% Total: -0.043
16.308 13.18 10.512 -20
Total Principal Lost: 3.692 6.82 9.488
Total % Principal Lost: 18.46% 34.10% 47.44%
Total Principal Remaining: 16.308 13.18 10.512

